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INTRODUCTION
The electric utility industry is perhaps one of the largest industries
in the U.S. economy.1  Nearly every individual, business, and
government entity in the United States uses electric energy.2  The
industry has more than $185 billion in assets and involves more than
3,000 companies.3  For decades, however, many parts of the industry
have been non-competitive.4 Instead, the industry was subject to
pervasive regulation by state and federal agencies.5  This preference
for regulation as the method for market control—rather than
competition—was the result of long-standing and widespread beliefs
within the utility industry that the economic character of the industry
left little room for competition.6
Recently, however, this once stable industry has begun to
experience massive deregulation.7  This deregulation is intended to
                                                 
1. See CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 623 (3d ed. 1993)
(describing the general character of the electric utility industry).
2. See Scott B. Finlinson, The Pains of Extinction:  Stranded Costs in the Deregulation of the Utah
Electric Industry, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 173, 175 (1998) (arguing that electricity is the most
common form of energy used in one’s life); cf. PHILLIPS, supra note 1, at 623 (noting that the
electric utility industry is one of the country’s most important businesses, serving virtually every
home and commercial enterprise in the United States).  Additionally, as an indication of the
importance of electricity to the U.S. economy, Phillips notes that although the U.S. comprises
only about five percent of the world’s population, it produces about twenty-six percent of the
world’s electric energy.  See id.
3. See Elisabeth Pendley, Deregulation of the Energy Industry, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 27, 60
(1996) (profiling the electric utility industry and comparing it with other regulated industries).
4. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Antitrust Policy in the New Electric Industry, 17 ENERGY L.J. 29, 29
(1996) (discussing the absence of competition in the electric utility industry).
5. See id. (describing the traditional regulatory and operating environment of the electric
industry).
6. See id. (stating that the beliefs of the utility industry were supported by the industry’s
use of cost-of-service regulation and the belief that large economies of scale existed in the
industry, concepts that were both considered incompatible with competition); see also Peter
Navarro, A Guidebook and Research Agenda for Restructuring the Electricity Industry, 16 ENERGY L.J.
347, 349 (1995) (stating that the preference for regulation was based on the industry belief that
generation, transmission and distribution of electricity established a “‘natural monopoly’ with
economies of scale or scope and high barriers to entry”).
7. See Navarro, supra note 6, at 347 (discussing various recent restructuring plans to
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introduce competition into many aspects of the industry.8  The
decision to introduce competition into this traditionally regulated
industry stems from evolving views about the economic structure of
the industry.9  Many analysts now believe that the regulated electric
utility industry was not acting efficiently.10  Such inefficiency has
resulted in a situation in which the cost of regulation has
overwhelmed any expected benefits.11
Deregulation of the industry is currently well under way.12  Already,
the industry’s wholesale sector has experienced significant
deregulation of the generation and sale of electrical energy, and
there also has been significant re-regulation of the transmission
sector.13  The retail portion of the industry is following suit.14  Many
states have implemented or are seriously studying and designing
deregulation plans to introduce competition into the retail sale of
electricity.15  Thus, it is clear that deregulation and competition are
approaching at a rapid rate.16
The projected benefits of deregulation of the electric industry are
immense.  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)
estimates that the annual savings from deregulation of the electric
industry will range from $3.8 billion to $5.4 billion in the wholesale
market alone.  Additionally, given the impact that electricity has on
the everyday lives of nearly all individuals, businesses, and
government entities, deregulation is likely to have wide-ranging
                                                 
drastically change the regulation of the industry).
8. See id. (noting that many restructuring plans included complete deregulation of the
generation of electricity, open and fair access to the transmission grid, and replacement of
traditional rate base rate-setting with a more market-oriented rate-setting technique).
9. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 29 (describing analysts’ concerns with the absence of
mergers and acquisitions and other characteristics of competition in the utility industry); see also
id. at 29-30 (stating the belief common among investor-owned utilities that “they will soon
experience the transition from the safe, quiet life of a regulated monopoly to the perilous,
volatile life of a participant in a vigorously competitive market”).
10. See John Burritt McArthur, Cost Responsibility or Regulatory Indulgence for Electricity’s
Stranded Costs?, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 775, 780 (1998) (noting that the decision to deregulate is
based upon the belief that utilities have not been efficient); see also Pierce, supra note 4, at 29
(noting that many analysts believe that the industry is unduly fragmented and could increase
efficiency significantly).
11. See McArthur, supra note 10, at 780 (arguing that collective regulatory imprudence has
occurred making the regulatory scheme ineffective and that deregulation will bring great
public welfare gains).
12. See Navarro, supra note 6, at 347 (describing deregulation as a “new chaos” in the
electric industry).
13. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the progress and status of the federal deregulation of
wholesale electric market).
14. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing state deregulation efforts in the retail sector).
15. See infra PartII.C.2 (discussing the progress of deregulation of the electric industry’s
retail sector and the form of several state deregulation plans and statutes).
16. See Pendley, supra note 3, at 62 (stating that the “[Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission’s] vision for the energy industry rests on competition”).
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effects.  With savings estimates of this magnitude and a deregulation
impact that is widespread, it is apparent why many have jumped onto
the deregulation bandwagon.17  As FERC Chairwoman Elizabeth
Anne Moler stated at the time of the Commission’s issuance of its
deregulation order, “the future is here—and the future is
competition.”18
The drive toward competition will bring many new challenges to
both those within the industry and to those that depend upon it.19
One change will be a narrowing of the protection that pervasive
regulation has traditionally provided electric utilities against
challenges to anti-competitive behavior under the federal antitrust
laws.20  Traditionally, utilities have been protected from such
challenges because state and federal agencies were intimately
involved in utility regulation.21  Utilities often operated in anti-
competitive ways and received protection through various antitrust
doctrines.22  As the industry deregulates, however, many of the
traditional reasons for such antitrust immunity vanish.23  One
doctrine that provides such protection is the state action doctrine,
which provides immunity from antitrust liability for state sanctioned
anti-competitive behavior.24  As deregulation of the electric industry
moves forward, the states will, by definition, be sanctioning less anti-
                                                 
17. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330(b) (illustrating the attraction of lawmakers and
consumers to infuse competition in the electric utility industry).
18. See McArthur, supra note 10, at 777 n.3 (quoting FEDERAL ENERGY COMM’N, NEWS
RELEASE:  COMMISSION ORDERS SWEEPING CHANGES FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY (Apr. 24,
1996)).
19. See Paul L. Joskow, Mixing Regulatory and Antitrust Politics in the Electric Power Industry:
The Price Squeeze and Retail Market Competition, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 173, 183 (Franklin
M. Fisher ed., 1985) (stating that concurrent attempts to advance competition and regulations
can cause difficulties).
20. See id. at 183 (recognizing that regulation is not perfect, that any residual regulation is
likely to be beneficial, and that narrowing of protections recognizes this change).  This
narrowing of protections occurs appropriately when competition is introduced into the industry
and regulation is eliminated.  See id. at 183-84.  As the level of competition continues to
increase, it is necessary to continue narrowing these protections to support the present level of
competition and encourage additional competition as desired.  See id.
21. See id. at 173 (noting that the purpose of antitrust laws is to promote competition,
whereas regulatory policies often restricted price competition and competitive entry, thus, as a
legal matter, regulated utilities are generally considered immune from antitrust liability).
22. See Pendley, supra note 3, at 64 (stating that monopolies often were allowed to exist in
the transmission and distribution functions of utility companies).
23. See id. at 76-77 (noting that electricity deregulation results in the “unbundling” of
generation, transmission, and distribution functions from within each utility company as well as
the introduction of competition).  Traditionally, the reason for providing immunity from
antitrust liability was based in the law’s recognition that competition was not always the most
desirable method for controlling a market, and that this was particularly true of regulated
industries.  See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (discussing the development of
exemptions from antitrust immunity).
24. See infra Part I.B (discussing the origins of the state action doctrine and its application
to the conduct of private parties).
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competitive behavior.  Thus, the introduction of deregulation will
have a major impact on the state action doctrine.
This Comment explores the impact that deregulation of the
electric utility industry will have on the scope of the state action
doctrine and the protection that it gives monopoly electric utilities.
First, this Comment reviews the state action doctrine by generally
reviewing the basic reasons for antitrust law and exemptions.  This
Comment examines the origin and development of the state action
doctrine, its application to private party conduct, and tests the courts
have developed for its application.  Second, this Comment discusses
the electric utility industry and the deregulation currently taking
place.  This Comment looks at the structure of the industry, the
traditional role of regulation in the industry, and the current trend
toward deregulation of the industry at both the state and federal
level.  Finally, this Comment analyzes the role that the state action
doctrine will play in the deregulated industry.  In particular, this
Comment examines the use of the state action doctrine in the utility
industry in the past and then applies the historical reasoning of the
courts to utility conduct in light of the deregulation currently taking
place.
I. THE ANTITRUST STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
A. Antitrust—Generally
Antitrust policy is concerned with the extent to which private
individuals and entities should be able to achieve and maintain
economic control and market power, as well as the extent to which
society should deal with such control and power through the courts.25
The purpose of antitrust law is to promote competition and prevent
undesirable monopoly power.26  Congress designed antitrust laws to
protect free competition and to prevent the excessive exercise of
private monopoly power.27
Most modern antitrust laws in the United States derive from
important antitrust statutes passed during the late nineteenth and
                                                 
25. See STEPHEN F. ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 1 (1993) (discussing the basic goals
of antitrust laws and noting that fundamentally, antitrust is about economic power).
26. See LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 14 (1977)
(discussing the general plenary purpose of antitrust laws).
27. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49 (1951) (stating that competition is at
the “heart of the national economic policy,” and that even though the economic theory
underlying the various antitrust laws may be somewhat different, the protection of competition
is controlling).
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early twentieth centuries.28  The Sherman Antitrust Act of 189029 (“the
Sherman Act”) is the most basic of antitrust legislation.30  The
wording of the Sherman Act’s two substantive sections—Sections 1
and 2—reflects Congress’s broad public policy against anti-
competitive behavior.31  This law, which supports competition,
developed as a result of fears aroused by the “vast accumulation of
wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals . . . and the
widespread impression that their power had been and would be
exerted to oppress individuals and injure the public generally.”32
Given the general nature of this concern, the language of the
Sherman Act is purposely broad.33  The statute does not specify
conduct that is prohibited.34  Rather, the Act only uses the general
phrase “restraint[s] of trade.”35  Much of U.S. antitrust law is based on
this broad statute.36
The broad nature of this antitrust statute has necessitated
significant judicial interpretation.37  Antitrust law, as it is understood
today, evolved through the interpretation of many novel situations
                                                 
28. See SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 13 (stating that the basic U.S. antitrust legislation is
found in the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994), and that the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1994), and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-44 (1994), are important
supplementary statutes).  Although the most important antitrust law is found in these basic
statutes, general antitrust concepts are also found in common law.  See ERNEST GELLHORN,
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing the historical origins of antitrust
laws).
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
30. See SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 13.
31. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994).  Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in relevant part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal.  Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of
a felony . . . .
Id. § 1.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in relevant part:  “Every person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”  Id. § 2.
32. EARL W. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 15 (2d ed. 1973).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id. (expressing the broad nature of the Sherman Act and pointing out that the Act
only indicates the end Congress sought by its passage, not any particular conduct with which
Congress was concerned).
36. See id.  Two other key antitrust statutes are the Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1994), and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-44 (1994).  These important
supplementary statutes broadened enforcement tools and expanded concepts established
under the Sherman Act.  See SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 13-14 (describing the importance of
the additional antitrust statutes).
37. See KINTNER, supra note 32, at 16-18 (discussing some of the many cases the courts have
used to interpret the Sherman Act).
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parties presented to the courts.38  One result of this interpretive
process has been the development of a limited number of important
exemptions to the general antitrust policy in support of
competition.39
B. Antitrust Exemptions
Facially, the antitrust statutes appear to apply equally to all anti-
competitive conduct, irrespective of the industry or party.40  Over
time, however, the existence of other statutory provisions, the
jurisdiction of administrative agencies, and various other policies
have led to the creation of several exemptions from antitrust
liability.41  The exemptions developed as the courts recognized that
antitrust law relies only in part on competition to regulate markets,
and that other mechanisms—some that limit competition—work in
certain situations as well. 42
Antitrust liability exemptions  are based on different sources and
may be defined in various ways.43  Some exemptions are based on an
express grant of immunity from Congress, while others are the result
of court-created doctrine involving concepts of federalism or
regulatory specialty.44  Occasionally, exemptions from antitrust
                                                 
38. See SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 14 (stating that “antitrust laws have not merely been
open to doctrinal interpretation, they have required it; the process of adjudication, more than a
means of enforcement, has been an indispensable element in the formation of the law”).  In
applying the Sherman Act, courts originally looked to common law.  See id.  As more elaborate
and complex situations arose, however, courts abandoned common law in favor of their
interpretations of the legislative history of the laws, the various situations that arose, and the
current debate about the nature and function of competition in the marketplace.  See id.
(discussing the ongoing doctrinal elaboration required by antitrust laws).
39. See 9 EARL W. KINTNER & JOSEPH P. BAUER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 34 (1989)
(reviewing the judicial decisions that supported exemptions for public utilities).
40. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994) (identifying only prohibited conduct, but not listing any
particular conduct, industry, or economic sector to which the Sherman Act should apply); cf.
9 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 39, at 1 (noting that antitrust statutes do not include exceptions
or differentiation).
41. See 9 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 39, at 1 (describing the process of interpretation
leading to various exemptions from liability).  For example, a court may find that antitrust laws
are not applicable, or the court may find that a certain amount of deference must be given to
administrative agencies regarding the applicability of competition in a particular factual
situation.  See id.
42. See id. at 34-51 (reviewing various legislative and doctrinal grounds for exemptions
from antitrust liability).
43. See SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 717 (discussing the formulation of antitrust
exemptions).  For example, in the past, electric utilities were considered natural monopolies.
See 9 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 39, at 32 (describing the application of antitrust laws to
electric utilities).  Therefore, competition was inappropriate.  See id.  Thus, it was generally
considered that regulation, which actually sought to restrict price competition and competitive
entry, was a more appropriate way to control the market.  See Joskow, supra note 19, at 173
(discussing the conflict between antitrust law and state regulation and the resulting immunity
from antitrust that has been generally granted to electric utilities in the past).
44. See SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 717 (discussing categories of antitrust exemptions).
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liability are found for certain types of conduct, whereas in other
situations, exemptions from antitrust liability are granted to
particular industries.45  In any case, the effect is the same:  when a
party with immunity based on an exemption is challenged for anti-
competitive behavior, the traditional antitrust remedies are not
available to the challenging party.46
Electric utilities enjoy no explicit exemption from antitrust liability.
Rather, the industry had traditionally been granted immunity
because of the view that the industry is comprised of natural
monopolies for which competition is inappropriate.47  Because the
purpose of antitrust laws is to support competition and because
competition was deemed to be inappropriate for the electric utility
industry, antitrust immunity gradually developed.48  The state action
doctrine developed as the source of this antitrust immunity.49
                                                 
45. See 9 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 39, at 4 (summarizing the sources of antitrust
immunity and clarifying that immunity may be granted to certain types of conduct or to certain
types of industries).  Conduct that may be immune from antitrust liability includes activity by
private competitors to petition the government to take certain steps—known as the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine.  See 10 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 39, at 186-87 (explaining that, under
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, private requests for governmental action are immune from
antitrust liability because such requests implicate important political and constitutional
concerns); cf. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965)
(holding that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies even if the subjective intent of the parties in
seeking government action is to restrain competition, and that motive and purpose are
irrelevant); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 135-38
(1961) (establishing the doctrine and identifying various reasons why private requests for
government action are generally immunized from antitrust law).  Additionally, immunized
conduct includes private activity that is sanctioned and monitored by a state agency or actor—the
state action doctrine.  See infra Part I.C (discussing the state action doctrine).
As opposed to particular conduct, antitrust immunity is also granted to particular parties or
industries.  See 9 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 39, at 4 (noting that in some cases antitrust
immunity is grated to certain types of industries).  For example, the McCarran-Fergusson Act of
1945, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994), confers partial exemption from antitrust laws on certain
activities of insurance companies.  See id. at 179-80 (discussing elements of the insurance
company exemption from antitrust liability under the McCarran-Fergusson Act).  Additionally,
exemptions are granted for more specific industries, such as in the Fishermen’s Cooperative
Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 521-522 (1994), which allows fishermen to act together in
associations in certain aspects of the industry.  See id. at 282-83 (listing the scope of activities
within the fishing industry that enjoy antitrust liability exemptions under the Fishermen’s
Cooperative Marketing Act).
Finally, courts interpret antitrust immunity in various ways.  See id. at 4 (suggesting different
approaches to questions of antitrust exemptions).  Sometimes courts interpret immunity to be
an exemption from the antitrust laws, and sometimes courts interpret immunity to cause a
repeal of antitrust laws in a particular case.  See id. at 4 n.6 (citing Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile
Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 301 (1973), and noting that repeal of the antitrust laws can be implied “if
necessary to make the [regulatory statute] work” but “only to the minimum extent necessary”).
46. See id. at 4 (noting that when immunity applies, antitrust remedies are unavailable, and
that often traditional antitrust concerns with competition are inapplicable).
47. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text (explaining the historical treatment of the
electric industry as one of a natural monopoly based on economies of scale).
48. See 9 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 39, at 32 (describing the basis for antitrust
exemptions as the belief that competition would not work in the industry).
49. See id. at 48 (describing the state action doctrine as a defense to antitrust claims often
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C. The State Action Doctrine
The state action doctrine provides immunity from antitrust liability
when a state indicates that it has a substantial desire to limit
competition in a particular situation.50  It is true that, in interpreting
the antitrust statutes, courts have expressed skepticism toward
displacing or preventing competition in an industry.51  It has also
been established, however, that a state’s decision that competition
should yield to some form of state regulation or other market control
may result in immunity from antitrust scrutiny.52  The U.S. Supreme
Court has stated consistently that, based on principles of federalism,
considerable deference is due to the states because of the important
role that they play in the area of economic regulation.53  It is this
deference to a state’s authority to establish its own economic
priorities that is the basis of the state action doctrine.54
1. Origins of the state action doctrine
The U.S. Supreme Court first enumerated the state action doctrine
in Parker v. Brown55 in 1943.56  In Parker, California enacted legislation
                                                 
made by utilities).
50. See id. (maintaining that, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943), a state acting in its sovereign capacity does not violate the Sherman Act by
restraining commerce).
51. See 10 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 39, at 126 (noting the general reluctance of courts
to attack competition); cf. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49 (1951) (stating that
competition is at the “heart of the national economic policy”).
52. See 10 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 39, at 126 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
support for the proposition that federal antitrust laws may yield to state regulatory efforts).  In
such a situation, state regulation of a particular economic sector may be the product of a
decision that competition is unnecessary or inappropriate for a particular industry or market.
See id.  The decision to regulate may also be the result of a desire to advance other, more
important, state interests.  See id. (noting that some examples of state interests that may be more
important include environmental interests, health concerns, or public safety).
53. See id. at 128-29 (stating that the principles involved are based on deference to the
state’s role and the limited intent of Congress to infringe upon that role).
54. It should be noted that a parallel but separate doctrine affords absolute immunity to
the federal government and its employees against claims under the antitrust laws.  See 10
KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 39, at 129 n.13 (noting similar doctrine applicable to the federal
government); see also, e.g., Lawline v. American Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1384 (7th Cir. 1992)
(noting immunity from federal antitrust laws applies to federal judges “serving as
instrumentalities of the United States”); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d 243, 245-47
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that federally owned railroad is immune from antitrust laws).
55. 317 U.S. 341, 362 (1943).
56. See 10 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 39, at 126 (identifying Parker as the case
establishing the state action doctrine).  Before the Parker decision, the Court had not addressed
the issue of whether anti-competitive conduct by a state government was subject to the antitrust
laws.  See id. (noting that, for the first half-century after the passage of the Sherman Act, the
question of applicability of the Sherman Act to government action had not been directly
addressed).  A significant amount of jurisprudence followed the Parker decision.  See id.  The
greatest outpouring of cases after the establishment of the state action doctrine began three
decades later following the Court’s decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792-93
(1975), which applied the state action doctrine to the conduct of a state’s bar association.  See
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authorizing the establishment of programs for marketing agricultural
commodities in the state.57  In doing so, the legislation restricted the
manner in which producers could market their crops.58  The purpose
of the legislation was to “restrict competition among the growers and
maintain prices in the distribution of their commodities.”59  Thus, the
state’s articulated purpose in establishing and running the marketing
programs was anti-competitive.  The plaintiff claimed that the anti-
competitive legislation was therefore invalid as a violation of, inter
alia, the Sherman Act.60
The Court looked to the explicit language and the legislative
history of the Sherman Act and determined that nothing in the Act
suggested that its purposes included restraining or invalidating the
activities or programs of a state.61  The Sherman Act’s language refers
to activities involving individual agreement or combinations and
conspiracies, not to actions of state legislatures.62  The Court held that
                                                 
10 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 39, at 126 n.3 (noting that the greatest amount of
jurisprudence actually started with the Goldfarb decision).  A number of important example
cases followed the Parker decision.  See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 579-80 (1984)
(holding that the state action doctrine can apply to actions of branches of government other
than the legislature, and that the doctrine does not permit an examination of the wisdom of the
state’s anti-competitive activity); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109-
10 (1978) (explaining that the state action doctrine would apply to state agency action if all
requirements for immunity were met); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389, 394-97 (1978) (recognizing that the state action doctrine applies to actions of
municipalities); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 595-98 (1976) (suggesting that the
state action doctrine would apply to conduct of private parties under the proper circumstances,
but refusing to apply it on the facts of the case).
57. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 346 (describing the legislation being challenged).  The plaintiff
was a producer and packer of raisins in California who objected to the manner in which the
legislation restricted his ability to market his raisins.  As a result he brought suit against the
administrators of the California Agricultural Prorate Act to enjoin them from applying the
marketing program to his 1940 raisin crop.  See id. at 344 (explaining plaintiff’s injury and
reason for bringing the antitrust complaint).
58. See id. at 346-47 (explaining the operation of the California Agricultural Prorate Act).
59. Id.  The California Agricultural Prorate Act declared that such restrictive marketing
programs were necessary to “conserve the agricultural wealth of the state and to prevent
economic waste in the marketing of agricultural crops within the state.”  See id. at 346.
60. See id. at 348-49 (describing the plaintiff’s complaint).  The plaintiff also claimed that
the legislation violated the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution.  See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3; Parker, 317 U.S. at 348-49.  The plaintiff claimed that because of the restrictions that
the marketing plan imposed he was unable to meet certain contracts for the sale of raisins and
was unable to participate in the interstate sale and purchase of raisins, and that this impact on
interstate commerce made the legislation violative of the Commerce Clause.  See Parker, 317 U.S.
at 348-49.
61. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51 (noting that the drafters of the Sherman Act did not wish
to interfere with activities that are not the result of individual agreement or combination, but
rather derive their authority from state legislative command).
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (referring to individual contracts and combinations, not to
actions mandated by state law); cf. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51 (stating that the agricultural
marketing program was never intended to operate by force of individual agreement or
combination, and that because it derived its authority from legislative mandate, the action
would not be included in the Sherman Act’s prohibitions).
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the state’s sovereignty made it inappropriate to imply that Congress
intended to invalidate acts of state legislatures, even when those acts
restricted competition.63  Thus, when a state imposes a restraint on
competition, the Sherman Act does not apply.64
The state action doctrine, as enumerated in Parker, has been
interpreted in many subsequent cases.65  Through development of the
state action doctrine, courts have identified three general categories
in which the state action doctrine might apply to immunize anti-
competitive behavior:66  (1) action by a state itself;67 (2) action by a
subdivision of a state—including a unit of local government or by a
state agency;68 and (3) conduct of private parties pursuant to the
direction and supervision of the state or its subdivision.69  This
Comment is predominantly concerned with the third application of
the state action doctrine—the conduct of private parties, namely
electric utilities.
                                                 
63. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51 (noting that in a dual system of government the actions of
the states are sovereign, unless within an area that Congress may constitutionally act; therefore
if Congress does not expressly state an intention to act within such an area, and take power
away from a state, such an intention to invalidate a state’s acts is not to be implied lightly).
64. See id. at 352 (holding that since the state made no contract or agreement and entered
into no conspiracy, but rather imposed the restraint as an act of a sovereign government, the
Sherman Act did not intend to prohibit such restraint on competition) (citing Olsen v. Smith,
195 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1904)).  Olsen foreshadowed the result in Parker, in a non-antitrust
context, by using similar state sovereignty logic and holding that a state could regulate whom it
would allow to be a river pilot and that the Fourteenth Amendment would not infringe upon
the state’s right to regulate the riverboat industry in that regard if it found only certain persons
acceptable for pilot jobs.  See Olsen, 195 U.S. at 344-45.
65. See supra note 56 (listing a number of cases interpreting the state action doctrine).
66. See 10 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 39, at 130-31 (defining the three situations in
which state action immunity may be claimed and the different requirements under each
situation for it to be successfully invoked).  While the state action doctrine may be applicable to
various categories of actors, there may be different requirements governing its application to
the various categories.  See id. at 131.  Additionally, a finding that the state action doctrine does
not apply as a defense to actions by one party does not address the merits of the antitrust claim,
and therefore does not imply that the conduct is automatically unlawful under the antitrust
laws.  See id. at 131 & n.20.  Indeed, even if the defense is not applicable to conduct by a private
party, it may not be considered illegal anti-competitive behavior if also undertaken by a state
itself.  See id.
67. See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 574 (1984) (finding actions by branches of
government other than the legislature covered by the state action doctrine); Parker, 317 U.S. at
368 (finding state legislature’s creation of an anti-competitive agricultural program protected
from antitrust challenge).
68. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978)
(applying the doctrine to actions of a municipality); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773, 792 (1975) (noting that the doctrine applies to actions of a state agency, but not to the
facts of the case).
69. See, e.g., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48,
66 (1985) (applying the state action doctrine to state sanctioned collective ratemaking by
private trucking companies); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 594-95 (1976)
(suggesting use of the state action doctrine in the case of a state regulated private utility
company, although refusing to apply on the facts of the case).
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2. Application of the state action doctrine to conduct of private parties
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,70 the U.S. Supreme Court first
suggested that the state action doctrine could apply to the conduct of
private parties.71  Detroit Edison Company, an electric utility,
distributed free light bulbs to its electricity customers.72  The cost of
the light bulbs was incorporated into the company’s electric rate.73
The electric rate, including the cost of the light bulb program, was
approved by the Michigan Public Service Commission,74 which
pervasively regulated the distribution of electricity within the state.75
For this reason, Detroit Edison claimed that it was merely following
the direction of the Commission.76  The plaintiff claimed that the
                                                 
70. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
71. See id. at 592 (noting that the state action doctrine might apply to private conduct if a
private party is doing nothing more than obeying its sovereign, or if the state is already
pervasively regulating an area of the economy in which the private party acts); see also 10
KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 39, at 163 (noting Cantor was the first case suggesting such private
party application of the state action doctrine).  Before Cantor, the state action doctrine had
been applied only to cases involving the conduct of states and state actors.  See, e.g., Parker, 317
U.S. at 352 (applying the state action doctrine to cases involving only the conduct of states and
state actors).
Cantor was also among the first cases to suggest that antitrust, in general, applies to
traditionally regulated industries like the electric utilities and that the policies underlying
antitrust and regulation are not necessarily repugnant and may even be complementary.  See
Joskow, supra note 19, at 173 (citing Cantor, 428 U.S. at 579 and Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)).
72. See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 582 (explaining that the utility provided electricity and free light
bulbs to approximately five million people in Southeastern Michigan).
73. See id.  (describing the rate treatment of the utility’s free light bulb program).  This is
basic cost of service regulation, where the utility’s regulator approved rate is determined by
summing the utility’s cost of serving customers, including the cost of such a free light bulb
program, adding an appropriate return on the shareholder investment, and dividing total cost
by the amount of electricity sold, arriving at a per unit electric rate.  See generally JAMES C.
BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 108-23 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing basic
principles behind cost of service regulation).  Thus, the cost of the light bulbs supplied to
customers by Detroit Edison was being paid for by the customers as a portion of their electric
rate.  See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 582.
74. See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 582 (describing the Commission’s review and approval of the
utility’s rates).
75. See id. at 584 (describing the legislature’s grant of power to the Public Service
Commission to regulate the rates, fares, fees, charges, services, rules, conditions of service,
formation, operation, and direction of public utilities); cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 460.6 (1970)
(vesting the Public Service Commission with complete power and jurisdiction to regulate all
public utilities in the state).
Once the state regulators approved the utility’s electric rate, the utility was obligated to follow
the rate without modification, including the light bulb program, until a new rate was filed and
approved by the Commission.  See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 582-83 (describing the utility’s inability to
change rates without state commission approval).  The utility had been providing free light
bulbs to its customers to some degree since 1886.  See id. at 583.  In reality, the Commission had
been approving the light bulb program as an element of the utility’s costs since 1916.  See id.  In
1972, the utility provided its customers with 18,564,381 light bulbs at a cost of $2,835,000.  See
id.
76. See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 581 (noting the lower court’s acceptance of the utility’s claim
that state action exempted the practice from federal antitrust laws).
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utility was using its state-granted monopoly power in the electricity
market, combined with its state-sanctioned rate support of the light
bulb program, to restrict competition in the unregulated light bulb
market.77  The plaintiff claimed this constituted a per se violation of
the Sherman Act.78
The Court identified two distinct reasons that justified using state
action doctrine immunity to insulate a private party from antitrust
liability when the private party was acting as required by state law.79
First, the Court concluded that it would be unjust to find that a party
violated federal law for doing nothing more than obeying its state
sovereign.80  Second, the Court concluded that Congress did not
necessarily intend to superimpose the antitrust laws as an additional
and possibly conflicting regulatory mechanism in areas of the
economy already regulated by the state.81  The Court, therefore,
indicated that conduct of private parties might be protected from
antitrust liability in certain situations if they are acting under the
requirements and regulations of a state.82
                                                 
77. See id. (describing the plaintiff’s claim).  Essentially, the plaintiff claimed that the
utility’s legitimate monopoly power in the electric market, making it the supplier of electricity
for every electric consumer in the market, gave it an unfair advantage in the light bulb market.
See id.
78. See id. (discussing plaintiff’s claim that the use of legitimate monopoly power in one
market to gain advantage in another market is a violation of the Sherman Act).
79. See id. at 592 (discussing the application of the Parker decision on state action doctrine
immunity to private conduct required by state law).
80. See id.  The Court also noted, however, that although it would be appropriate to assume
it is unacceptable to assign antitrust liability to a party for doing nothing more than obeying a
state command, such a purely state-ordered situation would hardly ever arise, as most situations
involve a combination of public and private decision-making.  See id. at 592-93.  Moreover, at the
time of Cantor, the Court had already noted in several cases involving a mixture of state/private
action that state authorization, approval, encouragement or participation alone would not
confer antitrust immunity, and that when the degree of freedom that a private party exercises is
sufficient, it should be held responsible for anti-competitive conduct.  See id. at 593.  As the
Court stated in Parker, the state does not give immunity to conduct by simply declaring that the
action is lawful.  See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
81. See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 592 (describing the reasons for applying the state action doctrine
to state required conduct of private parties).  The Court in Cantor later noted that there were
examples of state regulation where the purpose of government control was to prevent the
consequences of market competition.  See id. at 595.  Yet, the Court also seemed to narrow this
observation by stating that not all economic regulation was intended to suppress competition,
and that there might be situations in which a private party could be expected to comply with
antitrust standards in the parts of its business subject to competition, while still meeting
regulatory criteria in the monopolistic parts of its business that are controlled by regulation.  See
id. at 595-96.
82. See id. at 598 (noting the Court’s recognition that the state action doctrine might apply
to some private conduct directed by state law, but rejecting the application of the state action
doctrine to the utility’s conduct in this case).  The Court concluded that neither the state’s
approval of the rate structure, nor the fact that the light bulb replacement program could be
stopped without state approval, was a sufficient basis for applying the state action immunity.  See
id.
In rejecting the application of the state action doctrine to the conduct of the utility, the
1462 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1449
The Supreme Court later clarified that the state action doctrine did
apply to the conduct of private parties in Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v. United States83 and applied additional rationale
beyond that provided in Cantor.84  In Southern Motor Carriers, the Court
addressed the practice of common carriers—i.e., trucking
companies—that were organizing rate bureaus for the purpose of
jointly fixing prices before submittal to the states’ public service
commissions for approval.85  The joint price-fixing practice was
allowed, although not compelled, and monitored by the states’ public
service commissions, premised on the idea that it would lessen the
regulatory burden of the states.86
In Southern Motor Carriers, the Court clarified the principle that the
state action doctrine would apply to private party conduct sanctioned
by the state,87 as it had indicated might be appropriate in Cantor.88
                                                 
Court reasoned that even though it would be unjust to hold the utility liable for conduct
prescribed by the state, the utility actually had as much or more to do with the creation of the
light bulb program than the Michigan Public Service Commission.  See id. at 594.  The Court
noted the utility could conceivably stop the program at some point by getting a new rate
approved by the commission, and therefore, the utility was not simply acting pursuant to the
demands of the state.  See id. (suggesting that it is not unjust to hold a party responsible for
conduct that includes state involvement when the party has a significant part in the decision).
Additionally, the Court reasoned that although it would be inappropriate to apply the
antitrust laws to an area of the economy that the state was already pervasively regulating, the
state’s actual regulatory interests were in regulating the sale and distribution of electricity and
the distribution of light bulbs was not crucial to that regulatory purpose.  See id. at 598 (stating
that the state’s electricity regulatory scheme will not be rendered ineffective if a light bulb
program is to be outlawed as a violation of the federal antitrust laws).
83. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
84. See 10 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 39, at 164 (noting that the application of the state
action doctrine to private party conduct was required to maintain the policies granting
immunity to the state and its agencies’ actions).
85. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 50-51
(1985).  In the four states involved in the case—North Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi and
Tennessee—the State Public Service Commission was responsible for setting rates for motor
common carriers.  See id.  The carriers would submit proposed rates to the relevant Commission
and the Commission would either approve or deny the rate through established procedures,
thereby giving the Commission the ultimate authority over the rates.  See id.  In these states, the
carriers were allowed to combine and agree on rate proposals prior to a joint submission to the
regulatory agency.  See id. at 51.
86. See id. (noting the states’ belief that voluntary collective ratemaking reduced the
number of proposals and allowed the commissions to carefully review and consider each rate
submission).  Moreover, the Court noted that effective ratemaking would be very difficult if
such collective action were not allowed.  Additionally, the Court recognized that at least two of
the states believed that, in addition to reducing the regulatory burden, collective ratemaking
would produce a desirable stability and uniformity in pricing.  See id. at 51 n.5 (citing N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 62-152(b) (1982) and Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Rule 39D(4)).  Finally, the Court noted
that in all four states, the collective submissions of rates were voluntary and each carrier
remained free to submit separate rates for approval.  See id. at 51.
87. See id. at 56 (explaining the reasoning of the doctrine developed in Parker v. Brown—
that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to compromise the state’s ability to regulate
domestic commerce—applied to private party conduct).
88. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. 579, 592 (1976) (noting that under the right
facts the state action doctrine may be applicable to exempt private party conduct from the
1999] DEREGULATED ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 1463
The Court justified the application of the state action doctrine to
private party conduct by looking to the original reasoning established
in Parker.89  According to the Court, Parker developed the state action
doctrine premised on the assumption that Congress, in promulgating
the Sherman Act, did not intend to compromise a state’s ability to
regulate its domestic commerce.90  The Court noted that if the state
action doctrine were found to apply only to actions by state officials,
and not to private party conduct, the freedom of states to regulate
their own domestic commerce, absent the interference of federal
antitrust law, could easily be defeated.91  Any party could frustrate a
state regulatory program intending to restrain competition between
private parties by simply choosing to sue the private party being
regulated, rather than the state official promulgating the regulation.92
The Court therefore established that the state action doctrine applied
to private party conduct required by the State in order to prevent this
contradictory result.93
3. The Midcal two-prong test for application of the state action doctrine to
private party conduct
In Southern Motor Carriers, the Court also clarified that the state
action doctrine applied to private party conduct only if the two-prong
                                                 
Sherman Act).  Note however, the expansion of the logic in applying the state action doctrine
to private party conduct in Southern Motor Carriers as compared to Cantor.  In Cantor, while the
court indicated that the state action doctrine would be applicable to private party conduct, it
refused to apply it on the facts of the case largely because the private party—Detroit Edison—
played a large role in the decision-making that led to the anti-competitive conduct.  See Cantor,
428 U.S. at 594-95 (stating that the utility’s involvement in the decision to continue the light
bulb program made refusal to grant immunity just).  However, in Southern Motor Carriers the
Court expressly stated that the doctrine would apply even though the decision to jointly file rate
applications with the Commission was a voluntary decision for each carrier, thus placing greater
responsibility for such anti-competitive action on the private party.  See Southern Motor Carriers,
471 U.S. at 51 (noting the voluntary nature of joint rate submissions).
89. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
90. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 56 n.19 (recognizing that the Parker court relied
on congressional silence when holding that states were free to regulate domestic commerce).
The Court emphasized that although the holding in Parker was based on the Sherman Act’s lack
of an express intent within the statute to include state legislative actions in the prohibitions of
the Act, there was also evidence in the Sherman Act’s legislative history that affirmatively
expressed a desire not to invade states’ legislative authority.  See id. at 56 n.19 (citing H.R. REP.
NO. 51-1707, at 1 (1890)).
91. See id. at 56 (stating that if Parker immunity was limited to the conduct of public
officials, then a state would not be able to implement programs prohibiting competition among
private parties).
92. See id. at 56-57 (explaining that if the state action doctrine did not apply to private
conduct, a challenging party could simply sue the private carriers, rather than the state
commission, and defeat the state’s policy of allowing joint rate applications).
93. See id. (holding that if the state action doctrine did not apply to private party conduct,
the doctrine would stand for nothing more than a formal requirement that the challenger
needs to be sure to sue the right party to defeat state sanctioned anti-competitive policies).
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test previously developed for conduct by state actors and agencies was
met.94  Specifically, in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc.,95 the Court declared that a two-prong test existed for
determining whether or not the state action doctrine applied to
conduct by a state actor, such as a state agency.96  First, “the
challenged restraint must be one ‘clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy,’” and second, “the policy must be ‘actively
supervised’ by the state itself.”97  This two-prong test is now referred to
as the Midcal test.98
In Midcal Aluminum, the state implemented a regulatory scheme
required all wine producers, wholesalers, and rectifiers to file price
schedules and contracts with the state.99  The state then restricted the
ability of wine merchants to sell to retailers at prices other than the
prices stated in the schedules or contracts, thus stifling the
competitive nature of the market.100  Although the state limited the
prices that could be charged to those prices filed with the agency, the
state actually had little control over the submitted prices, and did not
review the reasonableness of the prices.101  The passive nature of this
                                                 
94. See id. at 57 (acknowledging that the circumstances in which Parker immunity would
apply to private conduct were most clearly articulated by the two-prong test).
95. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
96. See id. at 105 (noting that a two prong test had been established in the previous cases as
a standard for antitrust immunity under Parker v. Brown).
97. Id. (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978)).  Several previous cases interpreting Parker were evaluated and combined by the Court
to arrive at the declaration of the Midcal two-prong test.  See id. at 104-05; see also, e.g., New
Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978) (holding a state program was
not subject to the Sherman Act because the “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed goal
of the State’s policy was to displace unfettered business freedom”); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
433 U.S. 350, 362 (1977) (noting that the State Bar’s rules were immune to antitrust challenges
because the rules “reflect[ed] a clear articulation of the State’s policy . . . and were subject to
pointed examination by the policymaker”); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791
(1975) (stating “[i]t is not enough that . . . anti-competitive conduct is prompted by state
action; rather, [these] activities must be compelled by direction of the State acting as a
sovereign”).
98. See, e.g., Columbia Steel Casting Co. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 111 F.3d 1427, 1436
(9th Cir. 1997) (referring to the “Midcal Clear Articulation Requirement”); Municipal Utilities
Bd. v. Alabama Power Co., 21 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994) (referring to the Midcal two-prong
test).
99. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 99 (describing the State’s pricing program and citing to CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 24866 (West 1964)).  Although at the time of the appeal both parties in
the case were private actors, Midcal Aluminum was actually challenging the action of a state
agency.  The agency and original defendant—the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control—
did not appeal the lower court’s ruling.  The California Retail Liquor Dealers Association,
however, intervened in the lower court proceeding and appealed the ruling.  See id. at 101-02
(discussing the procedural posture of the case).
100. See id. at 99-100 (noting that no state-licensed wine seller could sell wine at prices other
than the set price, that the prices set were binding, and that selling below the price could result
in fines or license revocation).
101. See id. at 100 (indicating the state agency’s minimal participation in the regulatory
program’s details).
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regulatory scheme was dispositive.102
The Court found that the first prong of the Midcal test—a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy in favor of anti-
competitive conduct—was satisfied.103  The legislative policy of the
program was “forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to permit
resale price maintenance.”104  The Court, however, found that the
second prong—the anti-competitive policy must be actively
supervised by the state—was not satisfied.105  The state merely
authorized the price setting, but neither established nor reviewed the
reasonableness of the prices and was therefore not sufficiently
supervising the state policy.106  The Court emphasized the importance
of the second prong by stating that “[t]he national policy in favor of
competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing
arrangement.”107
The Midcal test was intended to ensure that anti-competitive
behavior would be protected only if it was truly the product of state
action.108  The Midcal test is widely accepted, because it provides a
clear guideline for determining whether conduct should be immune
from antitrust liability.109  Although the Court originally developed
the Midcal test in the context of anti-competitive behavior by a state
agency, it later stated that the two-prong test was applicable to anti-
                                                 
102. See id. (noting the states’ passive role decisive in finding no real state support for anti-
competitive conduct).
103. See id. at 105 (stating that California’s system for wine pricing satisfied the first prong of
Midcal test).
104. Id. (noting that the legislature’s statement of the purpose of a California statute
requiring all wine producers and wholesalers to file fair trade contract or price schedules was
sufficient to meet the first requirement for application of the state action doctrine).  This
holding shows how a clear statement of the legislature’s anti-competitive policy within a
legislative enactment is strong evidence that could be used in support of the first prong of the
Midcal test for finding applicability of the state action doctrine.
105. See id. at 105-06 (noting the second requirement for immunity under Parker was not
met).
106. See id. at 106 (noting the passive role of the state in setting prices and further noting
that the court did not regulate contracts, evaluate prices, monitor the conditions of the market,
or undertake any periodic re-examination of the program).
107. Id.  The Court also stated that “as Parker teaches, ‘a state does not give immunity to
those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate or by declaring that their
action is lawful . . . .’”  Id. at 106 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)).
108. See Cost Management Servs., Inc. v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 99 F.3d 937, 942 (9th
Cir. 1996) (holding that determination of whether state action doctrine applies rests on
satisfaction of Midcal test).
109. See, e.g., FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621, 622 (1992) (insisting on compliance with
both parts of the Midcal test to determine applicability of the state action doctrine); Zimora v.
Alamo Rent-a-Car, Inc., 111 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding state action immunity
when both prongs of the Midcal test were satisfied); Columbia Steel Casting Co. v. Portland
Gen. Elec. Co., 111 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1997) (using the Midcal test to determine that the state
action doctrine was inapplicable as the second prong of the test was not satisfied).
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competitive conduct by private parties acting under the direction of
the state,110 and therefore it applies to the conduct of electric utilities
under such circumstances.111
II. THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY AND DEREGULATION
A. Structure of the Industry
From morning to night, one is constantly surrounded by electricity
and its uses.112  Yet the importance and accessibility of electricity is
often taken for granted.  Like many other important industries that
operate in the background, few persons understand how the electric
industry operates.113  Therefore, before analyzing the impact of
deregulation on the antitrust state action doctrine, a basic
understanding of the operation of the electric industry is necessary.
Most people purchase electricity as a single “bundled service”—i.e.,
they pay a single price for all the requirements that go into
producing and delivering electricity—however, the industry is more
complex and must be examined in light of its key components and
players.114  The industry’s functional characteristics can be divided
into four components.  The first functional component is
generation.115  Generation involves the basic conversion of one energy
source—e.g., coal, uranium, solar radiation, etc.—into electrical
energy.116  The second functional component is transmission.117
                                                 
110. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 57
(noting that the Midcal test most accurately describes the circumstances in which the state
action doctrine applies to private conduct).
111. See, e.g., TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560, 1567-68
(11th Cir. 1996) (noting that the Midcal test was established to determine if the state action
doctrine applies, and applying the test to the conduct of the utility in the case); Municipal
Utilities Bd. v. Alabama Power Co., 934 F.2d 1493, 1501-02 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that the
Midcal test determines if the state action doctrine applies to the electric utilities in the case),
aff’d after remand, 21 F.3d 384 (1994).
112. See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 175 (noting the pervasiveness of electricity in all aspects
of life for individuals, businesses, and government entities).
113. See id. (noting that most people consider the electric industry to be a simple provider
of a single service for a single price).
114. See id. at 175 (noting the contrast between the simple perception and the complex
reality of the electric industry).
115. See id. at 176.
116. See George Sawyer Springsteen, Note, Government Regulation and Monopoly Power in the
Electric Industry, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 240, 243 (1983) (describing the most common
generation technologies).  Technically, the generation of electricity can be accomplished in a
number of highly complex ways including:  burning of fossil fuels such as coal, oil and natural
gas; fission of nuclear fuel; gathering of solar radiation; conversion of the potential energy of
water in a river; and gathering kinetic energy from wind.  See generally KAM W. LEE & A. PAUL
PRIDDY, POWER PLANT SYSTEM DESIGN 1-15 (1985) (describing various power generation
systems); MARK’S STANDARD HANDBOOK FOR MECHANICAL ENGINEERS § 9 (Eugene A. Avallone &
Theodore Baumeister, III eds., 9th ed. 1987) (discussing technical specifics of various modes of
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Transmission involves the process of moving electrical energy from
the point of generation to a wholesale purchaser located near the
ultimate consumer.118  Transmission is analogous to a “wholesale”
delivery.119  The third functional component is distribution.120
Distribution is the retail delivery of electricity and involves the
transportation of electrical energy from the transmission system to
the consumer.121  Finally, the fourth functional component,
sometimes referred to as ancillary services, includes the additional
activities that must be performed to coordinate and facilitate the first
three components.122  When analyzing deregulation of the industry
and the impact of deregulation on the antitrust doctrine, it is
important to consider these functional divisions, because they are
often the divisions used by states to determine what will and will not
be deregulated and subject to competition in the future.123
                                                 
power generation).  For the purposes of this antitrust analysis, however, the method of
generation is unimportant, rather, it is only important to see generation as the manufacturing
component of the industry.
117. See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 176.
118. See id. (noting transmission involves delivery of large amounts of electrical energy over
relatively few transmission lines to delivery points in the consumer’s area).
119. See Springsteen, supra note 116, at 244 (noting that in the production chain,
transmission links generation with ultimate delivery to the consumers).
120. See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 176 (describing transmission as the third component of
service).
121. See id. (describing the process and function of the distribution component as moving
the electricity through the low voltage system to the point of consumption); see also Springsteen,
supra note 116, at 244 (describing distribution as the link in the manufacturing process that
carries electricity to the consumer).  Distribution is often seen as part of the retail side of the
electric industry, whereas generation and transmission are often seen as part of the wholesale
side of the business.  See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 176 (characterizing distribution as retail in
nature).
122. See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 176 (noting the group of additional services used to
coordinate the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity).  The importance of
these activities is amplified by the fact that electric utilities, unlike almost any other
manufacturing industry, must produce electric supply instantaneously upon demand by
consumers; storage or inventory is not economically feasible.  See Springsteen, supra note 116, at
242-43 (noting how manufacturers of electricity must be able to provide electricity to
consumers over a wide demand range with no notice of constant, future fluctuations).
Additionally, note that the term ancillary services also refers to a specific set of functions
designated by FERC in the open-access order that are performed to support the generation and
transmission of electricity and are necessary for open competition in the industry.  See
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting
Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,579-80 (1996) (listing the six FERC ancillary services as follows:
scheduling and system control, voltage control, frequency response service, energy imbalance
service, spinning operating reserve service, and supplemental operating reserve service).
123. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the particular details of deregulation at the state level).
It is also useful to understand the basic role of the parties involved in the industry.
Traditionally, there have been three main groups involved in the electric industry:  (1) the
electric companies, (2) the consumers, and (3) the regulators.  See Finlinson, supra note 2, at
176.  Furthermore, there were traditionally four types of electric companies.  These companies
are the investor owned utilities (“IOUs”), the state and municipal owned utilities, the
cooperative utilities, and the federal power systems. See PHILLIPS, supra note 1, at 635-37
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B. Regulation of the Industry
The need to regulate the electric industry developed early in the its
history and continued with the technological growth that followed.124
As the industry grew, it developed into one that consisted of relatively
few companies and large economies of scale.125  These factors led to a
continual diminution of competition in the industry.126  This decrease
in competition was one of the major factors leading to the
government’s regulation of the electric utility industry.127  The
decision to regulate was consistent with then-current theories that
regulation was “a device that would allow a single firm [or a few
firms] to secure all the advantages of larger scale production but
which would protect consumers from the abuse of monopoly
power.”128  Since the 1930s, nearly all electric utilities in the United
States have operated under both state and federal regulation.129
Today, the electric industry is a highly complex agglomeration of
individual electric systems, most of which possess some degree of
                                                 
(describing the major ownership segments of the industry).  Generating capacity and
production is broken down between the company groups as follows:  there are approximately
250 privately owned IOU systems possessing about 77% of the industry’s electric generating
capacity; there are approximately 2,200 state, municipal, and local publicly owned systems with
about 10.2% of the industry’s generating capability; there are approximately 1,000
cooperatively owned systems with approximately 3.6% of the industry’s generating capacity; and
the federal agencies—e.g., large federal power districts—own approximately 9.2% of the
industry’s generating capacity.  See id. (delineating production capabilities by ownership class).
124. See PHILLIPS, supra note 1, at 624-25 (describing the history of the industry).  Although
the electric utility is vastly important to modern society, it is a relatively young industry.  See id. at
624.  Although an electric current was demonstrated as useful to make light in 1802, it was not
until 1879 that the first central station power plant was built in San Francisco to run the city’s
electric arc lighting system.  Additionally, in 1882 the first central station power plant was built
in New York City to power about 400 incandescent lamps.  See id.
125. See id. at 625 (discussing consolidation of the industry).  Very early in the development
of the industry, direct current technology, insufficient transmission assets, and limited demand
encouraged the creation of an industry comprised of many small localized companies.  See id. at
624-25.  “Frequently two, three, or more non-interconnected power plants . . . were built in the
same city.”  Id.  Consequently, while competition between these companies served the public
interest, it also led to a highly splintered industry.  See id. at 625.  For example:  in 1887, six
electric companies served New York City; in 1895, five electric companies served Duluth, MN; in
1906, four firms served Scranton, PA; and in 1907, 45 firms had the legal right to operate in
Chicago.  See id.  The result was a very inefficient market by modern standards.  Technological
changes in the late 1800s—including the introduction of the transformer, the use of alternating
current electricity, the use of higher transmission voltages, and the resulting increasing
economies of scale—led to consolidation of these small companies, creating what some felt
were natural monopolies and a diminution of competition.  See id. (citation omitted).
126. See id. (describing how technological and resulting economic changes led to
consolidation  and a diminution of competition) (citation omitted).
127. See id. (describing the early reasons for regulation) (citation omitted).
128. WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 16 (1982) (discussing the
views of Henry Carter Adams, who in 1887 was one of the first to suggest direct regulation of
natural monopolies as a means toward social welfare).
129. See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 182 (describing the history of regulation at both the state
and federal levels and its relation to the perceived monopoly power of utilities).
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local monopoly power.130  As of the early 1990s, there were
approximately 3,500 separate electric utility systems in the United
States.131  The largest 200 companies, however, control over ninety
percent of the industry’s generating capacity and directly serve eighty
percent of its ultimate retail consumers.132  This concentration of
monopoly power has continued to support the perceived need for
regulation into the modern era, and resulted in the preemption of
most competition within the industry.133
Regulation of the electric industry developed into a dual
jurisdiction system.134  Responsibility for regulating the industry is
divided between the federal and state governments.135  The
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution136 necessitates this dual
jurisdiction scheme.137  Application of the state action doctrine,
however, applies only to conduct by the state or sanctioned by state
regulation.138  As a result, for this Comment, the state regulatory
scheme and the state deregulation plans are more important than
federal regulatory issues.  The movement in state deregulation has
been preceded and heavily influenced by deregulation at the federal
level.139  Thus, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of both
federal and state regulation and deregulation.
                                                 
130. See PHILLIPS, supra note 1, at 635 (describing the current complex nature of the electric
industry today) (citation omitted).
131. See id. (providing electric industry composition statistics).
132. See id. (noting the degree of market power concentration in a relatively small
percentage of the industry’s firms).
133. See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 182 (describing the inherently monopolistic nature of
the industry and the resulting need for regulation).
134. See id. at 183 (noting how since the 1930s, utilities have been regulated by both the
state and federal governments).
135. See id. at 182 (discussing the jurisdictional split for regulation of the industry between
the state and federal governments) (citing the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828 (1994)).
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  The Commerce Clause states that Congress has the power
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.”  Id.
137. See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 183 (stating that dual jurisdiction between the federal
and state governments is necessary because utility transactions often cross state lines and have
an impact on interstate commerce, thus invoking the Commerce Clause).
138. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (explaining that the state action immunity
doctrine applies to conduct required by the states and is based on the sovereign ability of states
to regulate their own economic environment exclusive of federal regulation).
139. See, e.g., 1996 Cal. Stat. 854, § 1(a) (finding that the restructuring of the California
electric utility industry has been driven in large part by changes in federal law intended to
introduce increased competition); 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-101A(b) (West 1993 &
Supp. 1999) (finding that competitive forces are affecting markets for electricity partially as a
result of recent federal statutory and regulatory changes); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2802(1),
(3) (1979 & Supp. 1999) (finding that the federal government has introduced competition into
several industries that have been regulated traditionally as natural monopolies, and that federal
initiatives to encourage greater competition in the wholesale electric market are in the public
interest to extend competition to the retail electric market).
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1. Federal regulation
In 1935, Congress passed the Federal Power Act,140 which gave the
Federal Power Commission (“FPC”) jurisdiction to regulate interstate
transmission of electric energy and sales at wholesale intended for
resale.141  With the creation of the Department of Energy in 1977,
FERC replaced the FPC.142  Today, FERC regulates virtually all
transactions between utilities for the sale of electricity across state
lines and all wholesale sales and transmission transactions that occur
in the continental United States, regardless of whether the
transaction crosses state lines.143  Approximately twenty-eight percent
of the industry’s total sales volume is thereby subject to federal
regulatory jurisdiction.144
2. State regulation
Individual state public utility commissions regulate most aspects of
the industry not covered by federal regulation.145  Most state
commissions possess a general statutory authority to regulate electric
                                                 
140. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828 (1994).
141. See id. § 824 (declaring that the transmission and sale of electric energy, which affects
the public, is subject to federal regulation); see also PHILLIPS, supra note 1, at 648 (describing the
broad regulatory authority granted to the FPC in Title II of the Federal Power Act).  The
federal regulatory jurisdiction also includes regulation of hydroelectric power plants on the
federal water ways.  See PHILLIPS, supra note 1, at 644-45.  This function was actually created by
the Federal Water Power Act in 1920.  See id.
142. See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 181 (describing FERC’s creation and general regulatory
responsibility).
143. See id. at 183 (discussing the extensive reach of FERC’s jurisdiction).  Note that because
of the physical interconnection of the high voltage wholesale transmission grid and the physics
of electrical transmission, virtually any wholesale transaction within the continental United
States has an impact on interstate commerce even if the two parties to the transaction are
located within the same state.  See Federal Power Comm’n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404
U.S. 453, 461-63 (1972) (noting that studies indicate that transfers of electricity between electric
utilities located in different states commingle in an electrical bus).  This decision is the basis for
federal jurisdiction over all wholesale transactions, even when the parties are within the same
state.  See id. at 463 (holding that the physical explanation is sufficient to sustain FPC
jurisdiction).
Additionally, FERC jurisdiction includes sales by all utilities.  The term utilities, however,
includes more than just the common IOU electric company and is defined to include “any
person who owns or operates facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.”  See 16
U.S.C. § 824(e) (1994).
144. See PHILLIPS, supra note 1, at 648.  Although this percentage is a relatively small amount
when compared with that controlled by the states, the regulatory influence of the FERC is
significant.  For example, under the “filed rate doctrine,” rates set by FERC must be given
binding effect by state commissions.  See, e.g., Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476
U.S. 953, 962-65 (1986) (describing the history and development of the “filed rate doctrine”);
Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 381 A.2d 1358, 1362-63 (R.I. 1979) (holding that the state
commission must treat the FPC’s price as binding).
145. See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 183 (citing as an example Utah’s Code which authorizes
states to regulate all public utility operations and transactions not regulated by the federal
government).
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utilities, as well as other public utilities.146  For most states, this
includes regulatory authority to assign licenses, service territory
franchises, and also permits for the construction or abandonment of
generation and transmission facilities.147  Typically, state regulators
also regulate the rates that utilities can charge for retail sales.148
Generally, this authority includes the power to require approval of
initial rates and rate changes, the power to suspend rates, the power
to prescribe interim rates, and the power to initiate rate
investigations.149
C. Deregulation of the Industry
1. The federal deregulation actions
The most pervasive regulation of the industry continued until the
1970s.150  Until such time, traditional rate based regulation had
arguably been very successful with utilities constructing increasingly
larger plants to take advantage of economies of scale, shareholders
consistently earning stable and acceptable returns, and customers
receiving reliable electricity at rates that continued to fall in inflation
adjusted terms.151  During the 1970s, however, a number of factors,
including the oil embargoes, overbuilding by utilities, increased costs
of nuclear generation, virulent inflation, and reduced demand for
electricity, led to rapidly rising electric rates.152  Many analysts and
regulators perceived increasing rates as a failure of the regulatory
scheme, and claimed that utilities were not acting prudently and the
cost of regulation was too high.153  As a result, it was believed that
                                                 
146. See generally CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (Deering 1990) (granting the commission the
authority to supervise and regulate every public utility in the state and to do all things necessary
and convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216B.08
(West 1992) (vesting the public utility commission with the powers, rights, functions, and
jurisdiction to regulate every public utility in the state).
147. See PHILLIPS, supra note 1, at 136 (describing the powers of state commissions).
148. See Springsteen, supra note 116, at 251 (noting that states have regulatory ratemaking
authority over retail sales).  At the same time, states are prohibited from asserting any
regulatory authority over wholesale sales.  See Public Utilities Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam &
Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1927).
149. See PHILLIPS, supra note 1, at 136 (describing the authority of state commissions over
utility rates).
150. See Navarro, supra note 6, at 349-50 (describing utility regulation during the electric
industry’s growth period in the early middle 20th century).
151. See id. (noting the success of utility regulation before the 1970s).
152. See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 184 (discussing the reasons for changing attitudes about
the regulation of the energy industry); see also Navarro, supra note 6, at 350 (describing the rise
in the cost of generating electricity).
153. See McArthur, supra note 10, at 780 (describing concern over the large utilities’
operation of the industry).
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introducing competition would solve these problems.154
In 1978, the federal government took the first step toward
deregulation of the electric industry with the passage of the Public
Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978155 (“PURPA”).156  PURPA
permitted new, non-regulated parties to enter the electric generation
market.157  These new parties were called Qualifying Facilities
(“QF”).158  If an electricity generating entity qualified for QF status,
the local regulated electric utility could be forced to purchase
generation from that entity at the utility’s avoided costs.159  This
change was a seemingly small opening in the non-competitive nature
of the industry,160 yet it was important because third party competitors
were finally introduced into the market for the generation of
electrical energy.161
PURPA was followed by the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (“EPAct”).162
As part of EPAct, Congress encouraged further competition in the
electric industry by allowing FERC to force regulated electric utilities
to grant other parties access to their transmission systems.163
                                                 
154. See id. (noting the belief that industry’s imprudence “is the reason that the lash of
competition needs to be applied” and that “deregulation will produce large public welfare
gains”).
155. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified as amended at scattered sections of
16 U.S.C.).
156. See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 184 (describing PURPA as the “first taste of competition”
in the electric industry).
157. See id. at 185 (discussing the impact of PURPA on competition).
158. See id. (describing QFs as a “new form of nonutility generating entity”) (citation
omitted); Navarro, supra note 6, at 351 (noting that as a “new generation” of generators, QFs
rapidly proliferated).
159. See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 185 (discussing the impact of PURPA on electric utilities
and describing how PURPA essentially required electric utilities to allow an outside company to
use its transmission lines); Navarro, supra note 6, at 351 (noting PURPA provided a “must take”
provision which would require local utilities to take “any and all power offered by QFs,” and
noting that utilities were required to pay QFs for such energy at the “avoided cost”).  The
“avoided cost” is the “incremental cost of alternative electric energy” and refers to the amount
the utility would save by not having to purchase or generate that quantity of electricity provided
by the QF—i.e., the incremental or marginal costs, presumably including both variable costs of
production—i.e., fuel, purchased power, and other variable costs—as well as fixed costs—i.e.,
the capital costs avoided by not having to construct the capacity replaced by the purchases from
the QF.  See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)&(d) (providing rules for the purchase of electricity from QFs
by electric utilities).
160. See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 185 (describing the impact of the PURPA legislation on
the industry).
161. See Navarro, supra note 6, at 351 (describing the impact of PURPA as creating a new
industry of generators).
162. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) (relevant portions to be codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 16 U.S.C.); see also Finlinson, supra note 2, at 185 (describing
passage of the EPAct several years after PURPA and after deregulation of several other
industries had occurred, including the transportation, telecommunications, airline, and natural
gas industries).
163. See Navarro, supra note 6, at 352 (describing the opening of the nation’s transmission
grid due to the EPAct).
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Independent generators could utilize a regulated utility’s
transmission systems to reach a distant customer without having to
construct its own transmission facilities.164  Passage of the EPAct was
critical to the implementation of competition because it further
opened the industry to independent parties, particularly in the
market for generation.165
In 1996, FERC acted upon EPAct’s transmission open access
mandate by promulgating its open access order,166 Order No. 888,
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Recovery
of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities
(“Order 888”).167  FERC realized that unimpeded competition would
be impossible without requiring utilities to grant access to their
transmission systems on a non-discriminatory basis and requiring
utilities to unbundle electric service components.168  In Order 888,
FERC required utilities to file tariffs with federal regulators, setting
the terms and conditions for the use of their transmission systems,
and to allow non-discriminatory access to their transmission systems
based on this tariff.169  Thus, FERC finally set the stage for
competition at the wholesale level.170
2. The state deregulation actions
Nearly every state has taken some action to develop plans to
deregulate the retail portion of the electric industry.171  Because the
                                                 
164. See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 186 (describing the impact of the EPAct on the industry).
The third party generator would, however, have to pay for the use of the utility’s transmission
system.  See id.
165. See Navarro, supra note 6, at 352 (discussing the increasing competition in the industry
starting in the 1970s).
166. See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 186-87 (describing how FERC acted to promote
competition by ordering utilities to open their electrical systems and provide access on a non-
discriminatory basis).
167. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996).
168. See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 186 (discussing the reasons for Order 888 and noting
comparable access and unbundled service were necessary).
169. See id. at 187 (describing FERC’s open access requirement).  Non-discriminatory access
means that the utility owning the transmission system must not discriminate when providing
access to outside requestors of transmission service, and must charge the same “price” for such
access that they would charge to themselves.  See id.; see also Promoting Wholesale Competition
Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery
of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,552 (stating
that a utility’s purchase of energy must be made under the same tariff as the purchases of other
utilities).
170. See Finlinson, supra note 2, at 187 (claiming that with Order 888 and its open access
requirement, wholesale competition is “nearly complete”).
171. See Energy Information Administration, Status of State Electric Utility Deregulation Activity
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industry’s retail sales are regulated by state commissions, it is
necessary for each individual state to take steps to remove the
traditional regulatory paradigm and introduce competition in the
retail sector.172  States have indicated that deregulation at the federal
level has precipitated and encouraged their introductions of
competition into the retail sector of the electric industry.173  States
have also indicated that deregulation of portions of the retail sector
will result in increased innovation, improved efficiency, better service
from all market participants, and a reduction in the cost of regulatory
agency oversight.174  In addressing state efforts to deregulate the retail
sector of the industry, this Comment focuses on those states that have
already enacted restructuring legislation.175
                                                 
(visited Feb. 14, 1999) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/tab5rev.html>
(listing the current status of retail deregulation on a state-by-state basis).  According to the
United States Energy Information Administration, the following is a breakdown of state
deregulation activity as of February 1, 1999:
(1) States with restructuring/deregulation legislation enacted:  Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia.
(2) States with a comprehensive regulatory order on competition issued:  Maryland,
Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont.
(3) States with restructuring orders or legislation pending:  Delaware and Texas.
(4) States with regulatory commission or legislative investigation ongoing:  Alabama,
Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
(5) States with no significant deregulation activity:  Florida and South Dakota.
See id.
172. See supra notes 134-40, 145-51 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons for the
split between federal and state jurisdiction for wholesale and retail sales and the general
regulatory responsibilities of the states and noting the exclusive regulatory jurisdiction of states
over the retail sector).
173. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (noting that state deregulation was
influenced by federal deregulation and citing examples of state statutes which point to federal
deregulation as the impetus for their own deregulation).
174. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330(e) (West Supp. 1999) (indicating a belief that
competition in the generation market will bring economic benefits); 1997 Mass. Acts 164,
§ 1(f)-(g) (finding that the introduction of competition into the generation market will provide
incentives to act efficiently, improve markets for new technologies, improve public confidence,
and provide market participants with better price signals); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2802(5)
(West Supp. 1999) (declaring that competitive forces are more efficient than state regulation
for controlling the cost of electricity generation).
Additionally, several states have indicated through enacted restructuring legislation that they
expect general reductions in the overall cost of electricity to result from the introduction of
competition into areas of the retail sector.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-805(G) (West
1996 & Supp. 1998) (requiring a 10% reduction over a maximum of 10 years in the rate for
bundled service for retail customers unable to chose competitive electric service); CAL. PUB.
UTIL. CODE § 330(a)-(b) (West 1975 & Supp. 1999) (expecting a reduction of at least 20% in
the state’s $23 billion annual cost of electricity); 1997 Mass. Acts 164, § 1(w) (expecting an
initial rate reduction of 10% due to the introduction of competition).
175. See supra note 171 (listing the states and their basic position in the movement toward
deregulation).  A total review of the status of each state’s progress in deregulating the industry
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State deregulation plans allow competition in the retail supply of
the generation component176 of the industry.177  As a result, states have
declared that they will no longer regulate the provision of generation
services.178  Under state deregulation plans, any qualified entity can
provide generation services to retail customers, defined retail service
territories for generation services will no longer apply, and the
marketplace—not state regulators—will control prices for generation
services.179  Additionally, states have explicitly stated in their
deregulation plans that retail consumers will be free to choose from
alternative suppliers of competitive generation service.180
A number of states have also declared that other components of
the industry will be subject to competition.181  Some restructuring
plans will allow for billing and collection services to be provided on a
competitive basis.182  Electric metering and meter reading services also
                                                 
is beyond the scope of this Comment and is not necessary for the analysis of deregulation on
antitrust doctrine.
176. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (explaining the generation function of
the electric industry).
177. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-802(A) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (requiring public
power entities and the state commission to facilitate the transition to a competitive market in
electric generation services); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330(d) (West 1975 & Supp. 1998)
(finding competition in the supply of electric power to be in the interest of ratepayers and the
state as a whole); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2802(13) (West Supp. 1998) (declaring the
purpose of the Electricity Generation Customer Choice and Competition Act to be, inter alia,
establishment of a structure under which retail customers will have direct access to a
competitive market for the generation of electricity).
178. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330(l)(2) (West 1975 & Supp. 1998) (concluding that
generation should be transitioned from regulated status to unregulated status); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 1A(e) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999) (stating that a generation company will
not be subject to regulation as a public utility); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3202(2) (West
1988 & Supp. 1998) (declaring that under the Public Utility Act generation services are not
subject to regulation after March 1, 2000); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2806(a) (West 1979 &
Supp. 1999) (declaring that generation of electricity will no longer be regulated as a public
utility).
179. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-803(A) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (establishing that any
public power entity may participate in retail electric competition, and that all service territories
currently served must be opened to competition, 20% by 1999 and 100% by 2001); 220 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/16-103(c) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999) (stating that prices for competitive
components of service must be market based prices); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2806(a) (West
1979 & Supp. 1998) (declaring that generation of electricity will no longer be regulated as a
public utility and that consumers will have the ability to choose their own supplier of
generation).
180. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330(k)(2) (West 1975 & Supp. 1998) (announcing that
customers must have the ability to choose from competing suppliers of electricity in order to
achieve meaningful levels of competition in the industry); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A,
§ 3202(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998) (declaring that all consumers of electricity have the right
to purchase generation services directly from the competitive provider of their choice); 66 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2806(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1999) (declaring that consumers will have the
ability to choose their own supplier of generation).
181. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (explaining the ancillary services sector of
the industry).  Many of these other components would fall into the ancillary services functional
component of the industry.
182. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-803(C)(1) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (stating that
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will be open to competition in some restructuring plans.183  As a
result, different, independent providers could supply these services,
which previously had been provided by the integrated, regulated
utility as part of the bundled electric service.184
While state deregulation plans intend to introduce competition for
the generation market and for some other services, other areas of the
industry will remain regulated.  Generally, state restructuring plans
require that transmission and distribution services remain
regulated.185  Much like the federal model, some states require that
utilities maintain their transmission systems and allow open access to
alternative suppliers of generation services.186  Some states view
regulation of the transmission and distribution functions as critical to
maintaining high levels of reliability in electric service.187 Additionally,
several state plans also require utilities to provide default electrical
                                                 
billing and collection services will be provided on a competitive basis for retail loads greater
than one megawatt after December 31, 1998 and for all retail customers after December 31,
2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3202(4) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998) (directing that the
provision of electric billing will be subject to competition beginning March 1, 2002).  Billing,
collection, and metering refer to the functions of determining the retail consumer’s electric
bill, collecting payment, and transferring the appropriate payment to the providers of the other
services such as generation and transmission.  See id. at § 3201(8)(A).
183. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-803(C)(2)-(3) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (ordering
that metering and meter reading services will be provided on a competitive basis for retail loads
greater than one megawatt after December 31, 1998 and for all retail customers after December
31, 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3202(4) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998) (directing that
the provision of metering services will be subject to competition beginning March 1, 2002).
Metering and meter reading refer to the process of measuring the amount of electrical energy
and capacity consumed by the consumer as well as provision and maintenance of metering
equipment.  See id. at § 3201 (8)(B)-(D).
184. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-803 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (indicating in the
title that an “open market” will be created with the deregulation of these services).
185. See id. § 30-804 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (stating that the existing regulatory system
for distribution services is not impacted by the deregulation statutes); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE
§ 330(k)(2) (West 1975 & Supp. 1998) (declaring that the delivery of electricity over
transmission and distribution systems is and will continue to be regulated); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 164, § 1B(a) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999) (stating that state regulators will define service
territories for distribution companies and that the state regulators have the power to make
service territories exclusive for the distribution company).
186. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-803(D) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (holding that
public power entities must provide buy-through service on request at charges no greater than
the cost required for the transmission, distribution, and ancillary services necessary to wheel the
generation to the customer); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2804(6) (West 1979 & Supp. 1999)
(stating that transmission and distribution owning public utilities must provide service to all
customers and generation service providers that desire it, on terms that are equivalent to the
utility’s own use of its system).  Such open transmission access will be necessary to ensure that
competitive suppliers of generation services are able to deliver the electricity to the retail
consumers.  See supra notes 163-68 (noting FERC’s realization that similar open access is
required to support a competitive market in an analogous way at the federal level).
187. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330(i) (West 1975 & Supp. 1998) (noting the
importance of the transmission and distribution system to the reliability of electricity supply,
and requiring that the Commission take responsibility for regulating the inspection,
maintenance, repair, and replacement standards for the state transmission system).
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service to those retail consumers that do not or cannot choose from
competitive suppliers of generation and for those customers whose
alternative supplier is unable to deliver.188  Finally, states have placed
licensing restrictions on potential competitive suppliers of generation
and other services.189
The state deregulation plans discussed above are being
implemented to introduce competition in those areas of the industry
where it is believed that allowing competition can lower costs for
consumers.190  At the same time, the restructuring plans maintain
certain elements of regulation in those areas necessary to ensure that
competition in the generation market works while still maintaining
reliable service.191  In any case, the preference of states for some
increased level of competition is clear.192
III. FUTURE APPLICATION OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE IN A
DEREGULATED MARKET PLACE
In Cantor,193 the U.S. Supreme Court listed two reasons for applying
the state action doctrine to private party conduct:  (1) it is unfair to
find liability for merely obeying state law; and (2) Congress did not
intend to superimpose federal law on a sector of the economy already
sufficiently regulated by the state.194  Later, the Court added a third
reason for applying the doctrine to private party conduct in Southern
                                                 
188. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 1B(d) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999) (requiring
distribution companies to provide default service to customers who require electric service
because of a failure of the alternative supplier to provide for contracted service or who have for
any reason stopped receiving electrical service); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2807(e)(3) (West
1979 & Supp. 1999) (obligating electric distribution companies to provide market priced
electric service to customers whose power is not delivered by alternative suppliers or who do not
choose to select an alternative supplier of generation service).
189. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3203(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998) (declaring
that the Commission must license all competitive electricity suppliers).
190. See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text (citing examples of how certain states are
encouraging competition through deregulation).
191. See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text (providing evidence of continued state
regulation in certain areas).
192. Some of the restructuring statutes go so far as to explicitly declare a preference for
competition and against anti-competitive monopolistic behavior.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-813 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (stating explicitly that the state’s antitrust laws will apply to
the provision of competitive electric generation service and other public power services
declared to be competitive); 1997 Mass. Acts 164 § 1(j) (stating that the state must guard
against the exercise of market power in the electric supply industry); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2807(e)(3) (West 1979 & Supp. 1999) (obligating the Commission to monitor the electric
market and to act to prevent anti-competitive conduct and the unlawful exercise of market
power).
193. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
194. See id. at 592  (expressing two possible reasons why private party conduct may be found
exempt from the Sherman Act); see also supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the Court’s application of
the state action doctrine to private party conduct).
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Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States,195 and ruled that private
party conduct could be immunized from antitrust liability.196  Finally,
with its holding in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc.,197 the Court established the two-prong test which
required:  (1) a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy in favor of restricting competition; and (2) that the state itself
actively supervised such policy.198  In the context of the utility
industry, the purposes of the state action doctrine and the
requirements of the two-prong test frequently have been satisfied
based on the pervasive state regulation of the industry.199
With deregulation of the utility industry, however, this pervasive
regulation is disappearing.200  Therefore, given this shift in state
policy, it may be difficult in the future for courts to find the two-
prong test enumerated in Midcal to be satisfied.  Utilities may face an
environment in which conduct traditionally shielded from antitrust
liability by the state action doctrine will now be subject to antitrust
liability.201
States are still in the process of implementing deregulation, and
are moving away from the old regulatory paradigm.202 Utilities,
however, have been challenged for anti-competitive behavior in the
past.  A review of the logic that courts used in evaluating past cases is
helpful in determining how courts will evaluate such challenges and
the application of the state action doctrine in the deregulated
future.203
                                                 
195. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
196. See id. at 56-57 (confirming that the state action doctrine applies to the conduct of
private parties); see also supra Part I.C.2.
197. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
198. See id. at 105 (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978), and noting the two requirements for finding application of the state action doctrine);
see also supra Part I.C.3 (explaining the development of the Midcal two-prong test for the
application of the state action doctrine).
199. See, e.g., Yeager’s Fuel, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 22 F.3d 1260, 1272 (3d
Cir. 1994) (holding the utility immune from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine
for programs supervised by the state); Lease Lights, Inc. v. Public Serv. Co. of Okla., 849 F.2d
1330, 1335 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that the utility’s actions are immune from antitrust attack
under the state action doctrine).
200. See supra Part II.C.2 (describing the deregulation of the electric industry and the
introduction of competition at the state level).
201. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (explaining that immunity was granted to
utilities by the courts because of close regulation by the state).
202. See supra note 171 (listing state-by-state progress in the deregulation of the retail
portion of the electric industry).
203. See infra Part III.A (reviewing past cases involving application of the state action
doctrine to utility conduct).
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In order to examine the application of the state action doctrine in
the deregulated environment, this Comment first looks at the
application of the state action doctrine to several past cases.  This
Comment then applies the reasoning of the courts from these past
cases and examines potential results in a deregulated industry.
Finally, this Comment draws some conclusions as to how the
application of the state action doctrine will transpire in the future.
A. The State Action Doctrine in Past Cases Involving Claims of Anti-
competitive Conduct by Utilities
Since the early 1970s, competitors and consumers have challenged
utilities for anti-competitive conduct, even though utilities were
considered highly regulated, natural monopolies for which
competition did not apply.204  In the past, utilities were in some cases
found liable for anti-competitive conduct for refusing to sell
electricity to potential competitors, for refusing to transmit power to
potential competitors, and for engaging in costly litigation for the
purpose of stifling potential competition.205  Utilities were also found
to have violated antitrust laws for illegally tying206 the sale of
unregulated products to the sale of regulated electricity.207
In other cases in the past, however, courts have also frequently
found that the state action doctrine applied to immunize some anti-
competitive conduct by utilities.  Utilities were found not to be liable
                                                 
204. See Joskow, supra note 19, at 173 (noting that the Supreme Court has found that
antitrust policy can apply to regulated industries, that regulation and antitrust are not
necessarily repugnant, and that regulation and antitrust may actually be complementary).
205. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).  In Otter Tail Power, the
utility had engaged in anti-competitive practices, including refusing to deal, refusing to
transmit, and attempting to stop competition through costly litigation.  See id. at 368.  The U.S.
government claimed that such conduct was a violation of the Sherman Act.  See id.  The utility
claimed that it was immune from antitrust liability because, inter alia, it was regulated by the
federal government under the Federal Power Act.  See id. at 372.  The Court, however, disagreed
and held that the Federal Power Act did not repeal the antitrust laws and that the antitrust laws
and regulatory scheme can exist concurrently.  See id. at 372-74.  Finally, the Court noted that
the prospect of decreasing efficiency or losing customers did not excuse a utility from illegal,
anti-competitive conduct and that regulated utilities must rely on lower costs and superior
service to protect their business rather than illegally suppressing competition.  See id. at 380-81.
206. “Tying” refers to the practice of forcing customers to purchase one product or service
as a condition to receiving the product or service that the customer actually desires.  See
SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 431 (describing the basics of tying arrangements).  Forced bundling
or tying, if done for anti-competitive reasons—e.g., to leverage a company’s dominance in one
product into dominance in another product—is considered a per se violation of antitrust laws.
See id. (describing the consistent judicial interpretation of tying arrangements as anti-
competitive devices existing solely to extend market power in one product to another and thus
as per se illegal under the antitrust laws).
207. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 598 (1976) (finding that the utility
violated antitrust laws when it used its monopoly power in the electric market to dominate the
light bulb market by distributing “free” light bulbs which were actually paid for by customers
through the electric rate).
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for anti-competitive conduct for refusing to transmit power for
competitors,208 for establishing exclusive service territory agreements
with competitors,209 for tying the sale of electricity to other products
or services,210 and for other claimed abuses of monopoly power.211  In
these instances the decisions are very fact specific, and although one
court might find certain conduct protected under certain
circumstances, another court may find similar conduct not protected
by the state action doctrine under other circumstances.
1. Cases finding utility conduct protected by the state action doctrine
In Lease Lights, Inc. v. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma,212 the court
examined the state’s constitution and statutes to determine that the
state action doctrine protected a utility program providing low rates
for the leasing of outdoor lighting.213  The court noted that
Oklahoma law gave the Commission “general supervision over all
public utilities that supply ‘the production, transmission, delivery, or
furnishing of heat or light . . . .’”214  The court also noted that the state
constitution provides the Commission with the power to “establish[]
and enforce rates ‘as may be reasonable and just.’”215  The court used
these provisions as evidence that the state had a clear intent “to
supplant the market for leased outdoor lighting with active
regulation by the Commission.”216  Finally, the court noted that the
                                                 
208. See TEC Cogeneration, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560, 1570 (11th Cir.
1996) (finding the utility’s refusal to wheel electric power—transfer electric power from one
utility to another through an intermediate utility by direct transmission or displacement—to be
protected by the state action doctrine).
209. See Municipal Util. Bd. v. Alabama Power Co., 934 F.2d 1493, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991)
(noting that utilities’ private service territory agreements would be protected by the state action
doctrine if proper state supervision was found by the lower court on remand), aff’d after remand,
21 F.3d 384 (1994).
210. See Lease Lights, Inc. v. Public Serv. Co. of Okla., 849 F.2d 1330, 1335 (10th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the state action doctrine applied to protect from antitrust challenge the utility’s
special rate for leasing outdoor lights to electric customers because the Commission supervised
the rate implementation).
211. See Nugget Hydroelectric, L.P. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 981 F.2d 429, 435 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that the state action doctrine protected from antitrust liability the utility’s
refusal to grant a contractor’s force majeure claims).
212. 849 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1988).
213. See id. at 1334-35 (holding that the utility’s plan was protected from antitrust challenge
under the state action doctrine).  In Lease Lights, the utility, in addition to providing electric
service under a state granted franchise, sold and leased large outdoor lighting systems.  See id. at
1332 (describing the utility’s lighting program).  A group of electrical contractors claimed that
the utility’s low rate for leasing outdoor lights was an illegal attempt by the utility to use its
monopoly power to drive the contractors out of business.  See id. (discussing the plaintiff’s
claim).
214. Id. at 1333 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 17, § 151 (1981)).
215. Id. at 1334 (quoting OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 18).
216. Id. (finding that the first prong of the Midcal two-prong test, a clearly articulated intent
by the state to supplant competition, was met).
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Commission had regulated the outdoor lighting business for twenty
years, had established sets of guidelines for the utilities’ outdoor
lighting services, and had closely regulated utilities’ rates—including
the rate charged for the outdoor lighting service.217  Based on the
evidence characterizing the state’s regulatory scheme, the court
found the utility’s actions to be protected by the state action
doctrine.218
In a similar manner, the court in TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Florida
Power & Light Co.219 found that the state action doctrine protected the
utility’s refusal to transmit power from a competitor over its
transmission system.220  The court found an obvious and clear policy
to displace competition and rely on regulation in the areas of power
generation and transmission.221  The court noted that the Florida
statute “gave the [Public Service Commission] broad authority to
regulate [the utility].”222  This policy met the requirement of the first
prong of the Midcal two-prong test.223  Additionally, the court found
that the Commission had the power to actively supervise the utility in
the areas of transmission, rates, and interconnection—the issues
involved in the case—and if a complaint were to have been filed, the
Commission could have acted.224  This ability to regulate the utility in
the relevant area met the requirement of the second prong of the
Midcal two-prong test.225  Based on this view of the extent and
purposes of the state’s regulatory scheme, the court found that the
state action doctrine protected the utility’s actions.226
                                                 
217. See id. (finding that the second prong of the Midcal two-prong test, active supervision by
the state, was met).
218. See id. at 1335 (holding that the utility program was protected by antitrust immunity
under the state action doctrine).
219. 76 F.3d 1560 (11th Cir. 1996).
220. See id. at 1570 (holding that the utility’s conduct was immune from antitrust liability
under the state action doctrine because the conduct satisfied both prongs of the Midcal test).
221. See id. at 1568 (noting that the state has a clearly articulated policy against competition,
and that the utility’s conduct was performed in light of that policy).
222. Id. (citing to FLA. STAT. ch. 366.05 (1994)).  Additionally, the court noted that Florida
utilities have been subject to pervasive regulation through state statutes and that the Florida
Supreme Court had been active in judicial review of regulatory cases.  See id. (citing several
Florida statutes and court cases relating to the regulation of Florida utilities).
223. See id. at 1569-70 (holding that the first prong of the state action defense was satisfied).
224. See id. at 1570 (noting the commission was available to intervene in the issue and that
this fact supported the idea that the utility conduct was sufficiently supervised by the state).
225. See id. (declaring that the State Commission’s actions were sufficient to satisfy the
supervision requirement of the Midcal two-prong test).
226. See id. (concluding both prongs of the two-prong test were met, and therefore, the
utility’s conduct was immune from antitrust liability).
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Finally, in Municipal Utilities Board of Albertville v. Alabama Power
Co.,227 the court affirmed the lower court’s decision that the state
action doctrine protected agreements between competing utilities to
divide exclusive service territories.228  In a previous decision in the
same dispute, the court looked to various Alabama general legislative
acts to determine that the requirements of the Midcal test were met
for those general provisions.229  The court noted that the Alabama
legislature had a clearly stated policy of reducing the cost of
transmission lines by preventing duplication of power lines, and that
the exclusive service territory agreements developed by the electric
utilities supported this policy.230  Accordingly, the court found that
the legislative acts met the first prong of the Midcal test.231  The court
then noted that the Alabama legislature had set forth in the general
acts precise procedures for the division of service territories,
effectively limiting any discretion that the utilities may have had in
the development of the service territory agreements.232  This
constituted evidence that the state was actively supervising the policy
to displace competition.233  Thus, the court found that the
legislature’s general acts met the second prong of the Midcal test.234
Therefore, the conduct described by the legislative provisions could
qualify for immunity under the state action doctrine.235
These cases provide valuable insight into the type of evidence the
courts look for to determine if the state action doctrine is
                                                 
227. 21 F.3d 384 (11th Cir. 1994).
228. See id. at 387-88 (holding the private agreements met the requirements for state action
doctrine immunity).
229. See Municipal Utils. Bd. v. Alabama Power Co., 934 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1991)
(consulting the Alabama statutes for guidance).  While the court in this decision held that the
general Alabama Acts allowing the private agreements were immunized by the state action
doctrine, the court did not have enough information to determine whether the private
agreement acts, incorporated into the general acts, were covered by the state action doctrine.
See id. at 1504-05.  The court remanded to the lower court to decide whether the private
agreements were also immunized.  See id.  The lower court found the private agreements
immunized based upon the logic of the court of appeals, and this lower court decision was
subsequently affirmed by the court of appeals.  See Alabama Power, 21 F.3d at 387-88.
230. See Alabama Power, 934 F.2d at 1502 (citing ALA. CODE §§ 37-14-1 & 37-14-30 (1987)).
Additionally, the court noted that sections of the same legislation incorporated private
agreements to divide service territories and that this was consistent and in support of the
general policy of eliminating line duplication.  See id. (citing ALA. CODE §§ 37-14-8 & 37-14-36
(1987 & Supp. 1989)).
231. See id. (noting that the court’s analysis of the first prong focused solely on the existence
of state policy regarding competition).
232. See id.
233. See id. at 1503-04 (noting that the private parties could not exercise any private
regulatory power).
234. See id.
235. See id. at 1504 (finding that the provisions of the statute were therefore exempt from
the Sherman Act).
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applicable.236  In a deregulated environment, the courts will need to
look for similar evidence in evaluating future claims of utility anti-
competitive misconduct.
                                                 
236. There have been other cases that utilized similar logic in finding utility conduct
immunized.  In City of College Station v. City of Bryan, 932 F. Supp. 877 (S.D. Tex. 1996), the City
of College Station claimed that the utility and several municipals were illegally refusing to
transmit electricity from outside suppliers of generation.  The court looked to state statutes to
find that the legislature had defined public utilities to be natural monopolies to which the
traditional forces of competition do not apply, and thus the utilities are regulated by the state.
See id. at 886 (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c-0, § 1.002 (West Supp. 1996) (later
repealed by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 166, § 9 (effective Sept. 1, 1997))).  Based on this general
policy, the court stated that some anti-competitive behavior was a foreseeable result of the
state’s electric power policy.  See id. at 887 (noting that some competition suppressing activity,
such as “hard bargaining,” was foreseeable).  Thus, the conduct may be protected by the state
action doctrine.  See id. (finding that defendant’s arguments in favor of the state action doctrine
were sufficient to defeat the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion).
Additionally, in Transphase Systems, Inc. v. Southern California Edison Co., 839 F. Supp. 711
(C.D. Cal. 1993), the plaintiff claimed that the utility’s program of offering rebates for
customers who purchase certain demand side management (“DSM”) systems was an illegal
attempt to use its monopoly power to damage the plaintiff’s business.  See id. at 714 (describing
the plaintiff’s complaint of attempted monopolization by the defendant).  The court looked to
the state utility commission’s active involvement in the design and approval of the utility’s DSM
programs and determined that the utility’s conduct fell within the state’s policies, thereby
satisfying both prongs of the Midcal test.  See id. at 715-16 (noting that the state statute clearly
articulated a displacement of competition in the area of DSM programs and that the
commission’s involvement in those programs met the supervision requirement).  Thus, the
court held that the state action doctrine immunized the utility’s anti-competitive actions from
federal antitrust liability.  See id.
Finally, a state’s interesting proactive use of the state action doctrine is found in Municipality
of Anchorage v. Chugach Electric Association, Inc., Docket No. U-97-201, Order No.3 (Alaska Pub.
Util. Comm’n May 20, 1998).  In this decision, the Alaska Public Utilities Commission
specifically noted that its decision to confirm the Anchorage municipal utility’s exclusive service
territory, and to approve of the utility’s refusal to allow a competitor access to consumers within
that service territory, was being made to bring the utility’s conduct under the protection of the
state action doctrine.  See id. at 16 (stating that the Commission’s decision will satisfy the
requirements of the state action doctrine should it be challenged as being in violation of the
federal antitrust laws).  In doing so, the Commission specifically stated that Anchorage’s
conduct, which prevented Chugach from entering into the market as a competitor, was
supported by state statute, thus providing the clearly articulated state policy needed for
protection under the state action doctrine.  See id. at 8 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 42.05.221(a)
(Michie 1998), which provides that utilities gain a certificate of need from the Commission
before being allowed to provide service to the public, as evidence of the state’s interest in
restricting competition).  The Commission also stated that with the decision, it was making
clear that Anchorage Municipal Light and Power’s exclusive operation in its territory was and
will remain protected by the state action doctrine as the result of the Commission’s policy.  See
id. at 23 (stating so to prevent any ambiguity about the state’s policy toward exclusive service
territories in future litigation).  Finally, the Commission specifically noted that it actively
supervises and monitors the conduct of utilities in the state, thus fulfilling the second
requirement of the state action doctrine.  See id. at 24 (noting that the Commission regularly
supervises the operations of utilities to prevent any ambiguity about the state’s involvement in
actively supervising the policy in favor of reducing competition).  It is clear that the Alaska
Commission was intentionally emphasizing the state’s policy and active supervision to protect its
decision.  This case indicates how a state may go about ensuring that its policies in favor of
reducing competition will be recognized and protected from challenge under federal antitrust
laws.  Additionally, this is the type of clear statement of policy that a utility may be interested in
utilizing to ensure that any of its anti-competitive conduct is immunized.  These are the types of
state actions that the state action doctrine, as enumerated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943), was meant to protect.
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2. Cases finding utility conduct not protected by the state action doctrine
Although the state action doctrine often can be applied to find
anti-competitive utility conduct protected from antitrust liability,
there are several cases where courts have found that the doctrine
does not apply.237  These cases provide useful insight into the way that
courts analyze state action doctrine questions.
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,238 the U.S. Supreme Court found that
a utility could be subject to antitrust liability for illegally tying the
“sale” of free light bulbs to the sale of electricity.239  The Court found
that Detroit Edison Co. was not immune from antitrust liability under
the state action doctrine.240  The Court found the state action
doctrine inapplicable for two reasons:  (1) the decision to engage in
the program and to recover the costs through the company’s electric
rates was more the decision of the company than the state public
service commission;241 and (2) the bundling of light bulbs to electric
sales, although approved and supervised by the state agency, was not
integral to the state’s interest and policy in the regulation of electric
utilities.242  Thus, because of the extent of discretion the utility
possessed in developing the program and the small degree of
importance to the state’s regulatory scheme, the Court declined to
apply the state action doctrine.243
Similarly, in Columbia Steel Casting Co., Inc. v. Portland General
Electric. Co.,244 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the state
                                                 
237. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Columbia Steel Casting Co. v.
Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 111 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1997).
238. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
239. See id. at 598 (holding that Michigan’s approval of the challenged program was
insufficient for state action protection).  Although the light bulbs were given away free of
charge, they were actually sold to the utility customers in that the cost of the light bulbs was
placed in the utility rate base.  Thus the customers paid for the light bulbs through higher
electric rates.  See id. at 582-84 (describing the free light bulb program and the utility’s rate
base).  The Cantor decision went only to the applicability of the claim of immunity based on the
state action doctrine, and the case was remanded for evaluation on the merits of the antitrust
claim, but the parties settled before a decision was reached.  See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 86
F.R.D. 752, 756 (1980).
240. See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 598 (holding that there was not a sufficient basis for finding an
exemption from federal antitrust laws).
241. See id. at 594 (holding that there was nothing unfair in requiring the utility to conform
with antitrust law when it had sufficiently significant participation in the decision to adopt and
maintain the program).  The Court, however, did note that there may be situations in which the
State’s participation in a decision would make it unfair to hold a private party liable for
violations of federal antitrust law.  See id. at 594-95 (indicating this was possible but that the
record in the current case did not support such a finding).
242. See id. at 598 (noting that Michigan’s interest in electricity regulation will be almost
entirely unimpaired if the utility is no longer allowed to continue with the program).
243. See id. (holding that no sufficient basis existed for finding an exemption to antitrust
liability).
244. 111 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1997).
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action doctrine did not protect an agreement between two utilities to
divide the city of Portland into separate service territories.245  The
court first noted that technology and deregulation have recently been
exerting competitive pressures into markets where utility monopolies
once reigned.246  With this general preference toward competition in
mind, the court evaluated the particular Commission orders upon
which the utility was basing its anti-competitive conduct, and declared
that the orders were not specific enough to meet the clearly
articulated policy requirement of the Midcal test.247  In addition, the
court looked to a city ordinance that disapproved of exclusive
territories and instead favored competition—much like the
deregulation statutes that states are creating today.248  Due to a lack of
evidence in support of a state policy to displace competition, and
indeed the presence of evidence in the form of a city ordinance
expressly in favor of competition, the court found the state action
doctrine inapplicable.249
These cases illustrate the manner in which a court will examine a
state’s policies, and will refuse to apply the state action doctrine if the
policies do not adequately support the anti-competitive conduct.250
                                                 
245. See id. at 1441 (holding that eliminating competition between two utilities was not
protected by the state action doctrine because the utility commission did not specifically and
clearly authorize the division of the city into exclusive service territories).
246. See id. at 1439 (noting that any competitive advantage that the utility once had because
of the formerly non-competitive nature of the industry was now transitory, given the movement
in the industry toward deregulation).
247. See id. at 1440 (noting that none of the commission’s orders established a clear
expression of state policy to displace competition with regulation).  The court noted that the
particular orders established nothing more than a description of the status quo, and that the
utilities had stopped competing with each other at the time of the orders, not that there was any
intention that competition would be eliminated permanently.  See id.  The court expressed that
this was nothing more than “state authorization, approval, encouragement, or participation in
restrictive private conduct” and that the mere authorization or approval by the state confers no
antitrust immunity.  See id. at 1440-41 (citing Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 664
F.2d 716, 736 (9th Cir. 1981)).
248. See id. at 1438 (citing to Portland, Or. Ordinance 134416 (1972)).
249. See id. at 1441 (holding that the state action doctrine was inapplicable to the conduct of
the utility and the state commission).
250. A number of other cases also show courts using similar logic to deny use of the state
action doctrine because the conduct is not adequately supported by state policies in favor of
restricting competition.  For example, in another recent case, Snake River Valley Electric
Association v. PacifiCorp, No. CV 96-0308-E-0308, 1997 WL 241086 (D. Idaho April 25, 1997), the
Federal District Court for the District of Idaho found that the state action doctrine did not
apply when PacifiCorp refused to sell electricity or to transmit electricity for Snake River Valley
to serve potential new customers.  See id. at *7 (holding that the state action doctrine does not
apply to allegations that PacifiCorp has restrained competition in the market for provision of
services to new and existing customers).  The court looked explicitly to the Idaho statute that
provides that new customers have the ability to choose providers of electric service.  See id.
(citing to IDAHO CODE § 61-332C(1) (1994) which provides for customer choice if no existing
transmission line is located within 1,320 feet of the customer).  The court found this to be clear
evidence that there was not a clearly articulated policy to displace competition for new
customers and, therefore, the state action doctrine did not apply.  See id. at *7.
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Such logic will be important in the future because deregulation will
create policies that support competition in certain areas of the
industry.251
B. Applying the State Action Doctrine in the Deregulated Environment
In applying the state action doctrine in the future, courts will need
to continue looking to the conduct being challenged, and determine
if the state’s policy supports the anti-competitive behavior.252  While
the analysis should not change, the state action doctrine should be
applicable in fewer circumstances, as with the implementation of
deregulation it will likely be more difficult to identify state policies in
favor of anti-competitive conduct.253
A common theme among state deregulation plans is the
introduction of competition into the market for generation
services.254  For example, Pennsylvania has provided that “retail
customers will have direct access to a competitive market for the
generation and sale or purchase of electricity.”255  Clearly, this
                                                 
Similarly in United States v. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 172 (W.D.N.Y. 1998),
the court held that contract provisions, required by the utility, that prohibited a customer from
entering the electricity market as a competitor in the future in exchange for a discounted
electric rate, were not protected by the state action doctrine.  See id. at 176 (denying the utility’s
motion for summary judgment on the ground that the state action doctrine did not give it
immunity from the claim).  The utility relied on the state statute that allowed the Public Service
Commission to “authorize reduced ‘incentive’ rates that utilities may offer to customers in
order to prevent loss of such customers . . . .”  Id. at 175-76 (discussing the utility’s contentions
that the statute immunized its actions from antitrust liability and citing N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW
§ 66(12-b)(a) (McKinney 1989)).  The court, however, found that while the statute does
expressly allow the utility to offer such discounted rates it did not “expressly authorize utility
companies to offer discounted rates to consumers who are also potential competitors for the
purpose of inducing them not to compete against the utility”.  Id. at 176 (emphasis added).  Thus, the
court found that the utility’s conduct was not supported by state policy in favor of restricting
competition and that the state action doctrine did not apply.  See id. (holding that the state’s
policy of allowing discounted rates does not implicitly authorize anti-competitive behavior on
the part of the utility).
251. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the development of state electric deregulation plans
and noting ways in which they will encourage and require competition in certain segments of
the electric industry).
252. These are and will continue to be the basic requirements of the state action doctrine.
See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (stating
the requirements for state action immunity as a clearly articulated state policy in favor of
limiting competition and active supervision by the state itself); see also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341, 350-51 (1943) (noting that the purpose of the state action doctrine is to support the state’s
sovereign right to support an anti-competitive policy in the regulation of commerce within its
own borders).
253. See supra Part II.B.2 (noting ways in which state deregulation plans will support
competition as well as discourage anti-competitive conduct).
254. See supra notes 173-80 and accompanying text (discussing the state movement toward
allowing competition into the generation marketplace and citing several statutes providing for
competition).
255. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2802(13) (West 1979 & Supp. 1998) (declaring the purpose
of the Electricity Generation Customer Choice and Competition Act to be, inter alia, to make a
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indicates a legislative purpose in favor of competition in the market
for generation services.256  If the state legislature has stated that there
will be competition through deregulation, a court will be unable to
find the “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy”
in favor of displacing competition necessary for invocation of state
action doctrine protection.257  For example, if a utility refuses to allow
a competitor access to its current customers in an attempt to
maintain a monopoly in its current service territory, a court would be
forced to find this conduct unprotected by the state action
doctrine.258  After deregulation, state policies clearly will state a
preference for competition in the generation market, and such utility
conduct would be contrary to that purpose.259  Therefore, in the
future, the state action doctrine will not protect utility conduct that
constrains competition in the market for generation.260
                                                 
transition from a regulated to a competitive market); accord ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-802(A)
(West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (requiring utilities and the public service commission to act to
transition to a competitive market in electric generation services); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE
§ 330(d) (West 1975 & Supp. 1998) (finding competition in the supply of electric power to be
in the interest of rate payers and the state as a whole).
256. See 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2802(13) (West 1979 & Supp. 1998) (favoring a
transition to competitive market).
257. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.  This is the first prong of the Midcal two-prong test for
finding the state action doctrine applicable to protect anti-competitive behavior from federal
antitrust liability.  See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing the Midcal requirements for immunity).
258. See generally TEC Cogeneration, Inc., RRD v. Florida Power and Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560,
1566 (11th Cir. 1996) (describing the utility’s refusal to wheel power for the competing
cogenerators).
259. If, for example, legislation such as the Pennsylvania legislation exists, the state policy is
clearly to encourage competition, not prevent it.  See 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2802(13) (West
1979 & Supp. 1998) (indicating a preference for competition in the generation market).  This
is contrary to the facts in TEC Cogeneration, where the court based its application of the state
action doctrine on evidence showing “[i]t was clear that [the state] intended to displace
competition in the utility industry . . . .” See TEC Cogeneration, 76 F.3d at 1568 (indicating that
the first prong of the Midcal test is met by state policy opposed to competition).
260. Another example of the manner in which the state action doctrine would be applied in
a deregulated environment is seen in the facts of United States v. Rochester Gas & Electric Co., 4 F.
Supp. 2d 172 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).  In Rochester Gas, the utility forced a customer, and potential
future competitor, to accept a contract clause which forbade the customer from becoming a
competitor in the future—i.e., a no-compete clause—in exchange for a reduced electric rate.
See id. at 174 (describing the particular details of the contract provisions).  This was arguably an
illegal use of the utility’s state-granted monopoly power for the purpose of restraining
competition in the generation market.  See id. at 173 (describing the government’s claim).  In a
future deregulated environment, such conduct would clearly not be protected by the state
action doctrine.  First, state deregulation plans generally specify that there will be competition
in the market for generation services.  See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330(d) (West 1975 &
Supp. 1998) (finding competition in the supply of electric power to be in the interest of rate
payers and the state as a whole).  As a result, conduct clearly intended to restrict competition,
such as a similar no-compete clause, would be contrary to the state policy in favor of
competition.  Second, several states also specify in their state deregulation plans that anti-
competitive exercises of monopoly power should be controlled.  See, e.g., 1997 Mass. Acts 164,
§ 1(j) (stating that the state must guard against the exercise of market power in the electric
supply industry).  As a result, conduct such as a no-compete clause, forced through the exercise
of the utility’s monopoly power would be contrary to that policy and such conduct would not be
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Deregulation plans also call for the introduction of competition
into other areas of the industry, such as the provision of various
electric metering and billing functions.261  For example, the Arizona
deregulation statutes provide for the competitive provision of billing,
collection, metering, and meter reading services.262  These statutes
will make anti-competitive conduct by utilities in these particular
areas illegal and unprotected by the state action doctrine because
they express a state policy in favor of competition rather than anti-
competitive behavior.263  Potentially more significant, however, is the
impact that such deregulation statutes will have on tangential parts of
the industry that involve provision of services beyond basic electric
service.  For example, if a utility provides outdoor lighting services,264
discounts to contractors using electric heat pumps in new houses,265
or other services related but separate from the core service of
providing electricity, it may be more difficult for a court to find the
state action doctrine applicable in the future.266  In the past, anti-
competitive conduct by utilities in such related areas was protected
under the state action doctrine as the conduct was viewed as a
reasonably foreseeable result of the state’s general regulatory
program.267  Statutory deregulation provisions requiring competition
in areas closely related to the core provision of electricity, such as
billing or meter reading, however, could be interpreted to mean that
more distantly related services, such as outdoor lighting or heating
                                                 
protected by the state action doctrine.
261. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text (describing state plans for deregulating
various ancillary services in the industry).
262. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-803(C)(1-2) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (declaring that
billing, collection, metering, and meter reading services will be provided on a competitive basis
for retail loads greater than one megawatt after December 31, 1998 and for all retail customers
after December 31, 2000); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3202(4) (West 1964 & Supp.
1998) (declaring that the provision of electric billing and metering will be subject to
competition beginning March 1, 2002).
263. Statutes such as these express a clearly articulated state policy in favor of competition,
not in favor of restraining competition, and as such, the first prong of the Midcal test would not
be met.  See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (requiring a “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy” in support of
restraining competition as the first prong in the test for applying the state action doctrine to
private party conduct).
264. See Lease Lights, Inc. v. Public Serv. Co. of Okla., 849 F.2d 1330, 1332 (10th Cir. 1988)
(describing the utility’s program providing outdoor high power lighting).
265. See Yeager’s Fuel, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 22 F.3d 1260, 1263 (3d Cir.
1994) (describing the utility’s program offering discount for housing contractors using electric
heat pumps).
266. See id. at 1273 (holding that utility’s claim of state action immunity to be valid); Lease
Lights, 849 F.2d at 1336 (holding that state action doctrine protected actions by utility).
267. See Yeager’s Fuel, 22 F.3d at 1268 (indicating that it is foreseeable that anti-competitive
effects could result from the state’s policy in favor of load management programs); Lease Lights,
849 F.2d at 1334 (finding that the state’s legislative control over the electric utilities entails
regulation of the outdoor lighting business).
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systems, also must be subject to competition.268  Therefore, the
movement toward state deregulation will reduce the scope of
activities protected by the state action doctrine to those specifically
and clearly stated as regulated, and will not include services merely
related to the provision of electricity.
Although the scope and application of the state action doctrine will
certainly be reduced with the implementation of state deregulation,
there will still be areas where state action immunity will remain.  State
deregulation plans generally provide for the continued regulation—
and accompanying preclusion of competition—in certain sectors of
the industry.269  For example, state deregulation plans explicitly
provide that the transmission and distribution components of the
industry will remain regulated.270  Such explicit declarations of state
intention to maintain regulation in the areas of transmission and
distribution will therefore provide the clearly articulated state policy
in favor of suppressing competition needed for the application of the
state action doctrine.271  Therefore, even though deregulation of the
electric industry will make application of the state action doctrine less
frequent, the doctrine will still have some applicability.
CONCLUSION
The state action doctrine has been an important source of
immunity from liability under federal antitrust statutes for electric
utilities in the past.  The doctrine has provided immunity to utilities
for anti-competitive conduct, including refusal to deal, tying
arrangements, and use of monopoly power to reduce competition.
This immunity is based on state policies in favor of regulation of the
industry and in favor of the suppression of competition.  States,
however, are rapidly introducing competition into the retail sector.
As a result, the applicability of the state action doctrine to utility
conduct is significantly being reduced.  Thus, utilities must be more
                                                 
268. See supra notes 264-70 (discussing the nature of such programs and their ties to the
state’s regulatory interests).
269. See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text (describing areas to remain regulated in
state deregulation plans).
270. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-804 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (stating that the existing
regulatory system for distribution services is not impacted by the deregulation statutes); CAL.
PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330(k)(2) (West 1975 & Supp. 1998) (declaring that the delivery of
electricity over transmission and distribution systems is, and will continue to be, regulated);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 1B(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998) (stating that the state
regulators will define service territories for distribution companies and that the state regulators
have the power to make service territories exclusive for the distribution company).
271. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (holding the first prong of the test for applying the state action doctrine is met only if
the state has clearly articulated a state policy against competition).
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cognizant of the remaining state policies in favor of suppressing
competition, and limit anti-competitive conduct to that which can be
part of that policy.
